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The Ezemvelo Farmers’ Organisation (EFO) is a certifi d organic smallholder group in 
KwaZulu-Natal province (South Africa) that exists as an institution to improve smallholder 
access to niche markets by reducing unit production and transaction costs. The study is 
motivated by the need to understand drivers of colle tive action, prevalence of internal 
group free-riding, and the impact of contract terms on contract performance. These three 
theoretical concepts are pertinent in understanding organisational and institutional issues 
affecting the performance of smallholder organic farming groups and in formulating 
policies to promote the performance of such groups. The study relies on the theoretical 
foundations of collective action, free-riding and contracts found within the realm of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). These theories, though separate, are in fact related in 
certain respects. Collective action in smallholder groups, apart from being a function of a 
plethora of socio-economic factors, including transaction costs, could be constrained by 
free-riding within the group, which in turn could be influenced by flawed contractual 
arrangements.  
 
This study of collective action focuses on 200 farmers drawn from a sample survey of 49 
non-EFO members, and a census survey of 103 partially certified and 48 fully certified 
EFO members. A ‘collective action’ model investigates the impact of perceived benefits 
and savings on production and transaction costs attributed to collective action by drawing 
comparisons between EFO members and non-members using a multinomial logit model.  
The study of free-riding uses data from 151 members of the EFO to construct an index of 
free-riding within the group using principal components analysis (PCA). A ‘contract 
model’, which also focuses on EFO members only,  attempts to measure the impact of 






determinants of preferred contract terms using a combination of PCA, Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression, and logit models. 
 
Results indicate that continued participation in EFO is not influenced by the age or gender 
of the farmer, but positively influenced by growth in the net benefits of participation, and 
negatively by an increase in the size of the household’s cropland or non-farm earnings. 
With respect to production and transaction costs, the results suggest that EFO has reduced 
fully certified members’ concerns that crops would be damaged by livestock or constrained 
by inadequate technical information. However, this is not the case for other problems such 
as price uncertainty in conventional markets, a lack of affordable operating inputs, a lack 
of affordable transport, and a lack of communications infrastructure.  
 
The index of free-riding behaviour constructed using principal components analysis 
suggests that free-riding poses a serious threat to EFO’s collective marketing efforts. 
Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis of the ind x scores shows that members who 
are male, poorly educated, partially certified, aware of loopholes in the grading system, 
and who do not trust the buyer are more likely to free-ride. 
 
Benefits accruing to EFO members are limited and there is substantial confusion among 
members about the terms of EFO’s verbal contract with the pack house that purchases their 
organic produce. Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis of the impact that perceived 
contractual terms have on quantities delivered to the pack house yielded interesting 
findings. Perceptions that delivery calls are made by the buyer, that grading procedures are 
flawed and that prices are not jointly established were found to reduce quantities delivered 






models estimated to identify the determinants of prefer ed contract clauses indicate that 
farmers with higher levels of formal education and farm income, and lower levels of 
experience, favour a written contract over a verbal contract. Similarly, farmers with higher 
levels of formal education and lower levels of family farm labour favour a contract 
denominated by area rather than weight. 
 
It is concluded that EFO should recruit households that rely on farming for income and 
which are land constrained. EFO is more likely to survive if it continues to secure fully 
subsidised information, transport, fencing, and certification services for its members, and if 
it improves the benefits of participating by synchronising harvest and delivery dates, 
negotiating price discounts for organic inputs, andby maintaining an office with telephone, 
fax and postal services. In the longer-term, EFO should address institutionalised free-riding 
by issuing tradable ownership rights. In the short-term, EFO must engage with the pack 
house (buyer) to remove flaws in the grading process that conceal the origin of low quality 
produce. Transparent and mediated negotiations leading to an incentive compliant contract 
with the buyer may also help to build trust and reduce free-riding within EFO.  
 
It is also recommended that the terms of EFO’s contract with the pack house should be 
revised so that; (a) delivery calls can be made by ither the pack house or by EFO during 
specified periods and with reasonable notice, and (b) grading procedures are fully 
transparent and ensure traceability so that losses cau ed by poor quality can be internalised 
to members who deliver inferior produce. In addition, it is important that prices be 
negotiated at the beginning of each season and that the contractual parties have recourse to 
pre-agreed facilitators and an arbitrator to resolve disputes on price and quality. A written 






contract is explained to current and prospective members, and that growers are fully 
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1.1 Agricultural challenges facing developing countries 
The world is facing a number of challenges: specifically the paradox that the world has 
sufficient food supplies, but millions of people gohungry; grain productivity has been 
declining in the last two decades despite increased use of chemical agricultural inputs; 
costs of agricultural inputs have been rising in the face of declining commodity prices in 
the last five decades; nutrition related diseases ar  on the increase in the face of abundant 
information and technologies; and industrialised food systems have environmental and 
social costs that threaten food security (Kalibwani, 2005).  
 
Many sub-Saharan countries liberalised their markets in the mid 1980s and 1990s by 
embarking on market led poverty reduction initiatives to promote economic growth and 
counter these challenges. These initiatives produced mixed results (Kydd & Dorward, 
2004) either due to partial implementation in some cases and/or complete policy reversal in 
others (Jayne t al., 2002; Kherallah et al., 2000). Despite these set backs, liberalisation 
presented new opportunities for smallholders by availing more market choice regarding 
produce markets and input suppliers.  
 
South Africa’s agricultural economy is made up of two sectors that are structurally 
disconnected. These are predominantly subsistence oriented rural sector and well 
developed commercial sector (Mbeki, 2004).  The country’s agricultural sector was 
liberalised and has been undergoing transformation s nce 1994. For example, marketing 
boards were abolished, subsidies eliminated, minimum farm wages introduced, and land 






smallholders in alternative food production systems such as organic agriculture could 
provide the much needed impetus to develop the agricultural sector. 
 
1.2 Emerging trends in the organic farming sector 
About 120 countries worldwide are practising certified organic agriculture, with even a 
greater number of countries engaged in uncertified organic farming. Close to 51 million 
hectares of land worldwide are under organic certification. Africa has the least amount of 
organically managed land amounting to approximately 3 per cent of world’s total organic 
holdings (Yussefi, 2006). At country level, South Africa has about 5 per cent of its total 
agricultural land under organic production and the number of organically certified farms 
increased  from about 150 in 1999 to 240 in 2001 covering 45 000 hectares (Moffet, 2001; 
Yussefi, 2006). Globally, the major organic markets are North America and Europe, which 
both accounted for total organic sales of 27.8 billion United States dollars in 2004. The 
contribution of African markets to global organic sales is minute and a few African 
countries such as Egypt, Kenya and South Africa have small organic markets that are 
thinly traded.  
 
1.3 Smallholder challenges in accessing high value organic markets 
Numerous studies have identified a range of challenges prohibiting market access by 
smallholders. These include high transaction costs and problems of asymmetrical 
information, low local effective demand, and lack of c mpetition among buyers leading to 
low prices (Kindness & Gordon, 2001; North, 2000; Kherellah & Kirsten, 2001). Low 
produce quality and quantity and high grading costs incurred by processors and traders and 
high assembly costs, market risk and cash flow problems experienced by intermediaries, all 






hindering their ability to enter high value niche markets (Jones et al., 2002). The market 
access problem is further compounded by spatial and scale factors, which in the absence of 
better coordination efforts, leaves smallholders unable to attain economies of scale and 
sufficient market power to negotiate better prices unlike large commercial farms (Johnson 
& Berdegue, 2004).  
 
Temu and Temu (2005) attribute lack of smallholder access to high value markets to: 
changes in market chains in importing countries (where a few large retailers now prefer to 
deal directly with producers); the presence of oligopolistic buyers in domestic markets; and 
increasing demand for value added products – which demand substantial capital 
investments unaffordable to small producers. Hallam et al. (2004) argue that market access 
by smallholders is constrained by the need to comply with legal and commercial 
requirements (pesticide residues, phyto-sanitary requi ments, hazard analysis, etc.), which 
impose additional costs on smallholders and renders th ir production system economically 
unviable.  
 
1.4 Assessing effectiveness of institutional arrangements 
To counter market access challenges, Stockbridge et al. (2003), suggest the use of new 
collective forms of organisation to assist with analysis, advocacy, marketing, bargaining 
and local development. Success stories like the Hortico Out-Grower Scheme in Zimbabwe, 
Fresh Produce Association in Kenya, Pool Marketing in Zimbabwe and the Capespan 
Group in South Africa all point to the need for collective marketing in accessing higher 
value markets (Temu & Temu, 2005). Organisations and institutional arrangements in 






costs and promote efficient economic performance giv n the high occurrence of market 
failures and incomplete markets (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2001). 
 
Horizontal coordination manifests in a number of ways ranging from informal agreements 
between producers to coordinate sales and purchases to much more organised groups that 
hire managers such as investor owned firms (Poulton & Lyne, forthcoming). Participation 
in such collection action is not without its own costs. Producers may have to contend with 
spending time at meetings, negotiating and complying with regulatory standards, and 
providing information to the organisation (Doner & Schneider, 2000). Such costs, and 
pervasive institutional problems manifesting themselves as free-riding, tend to discourage 
farmer participation and investment.  
 
Different authors have defined collective action differently, but most definitions agree that 
it is action taken by a group directly or indirectly hrough an organisation in pursuit of 
members’ shared interest (Sandler, 1992; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001). Much attention has 
been directed at explaining collective action and the factors that support or discourage it. 
Success of collective efforts depends on the nature of the collective action problem, group 
attributes, institutional arrangements, and external i fluences (Sandler, 1992). It is 
generally accepted that an individual’s participation s greatly influenced by the costs and 
benefits associated with group participation (Matta & Alavalapati, 2006). One of the 
important benefits in organic farming groups is theexpected reduction in unit transaction 







Transaction costs are the ex-ante and ex-post costs of carrying out economic exchange and 
are household specific (Key et al., 2000; Goetz, 1992). Ex-ante transaction costs are 
predominantly fixed-exchange costs whereas ex-post costs are mainly variable costs 
associated with compliance and risk. Organic farmers are expected to encounter not only 
the usual transaction costs that prevail under conventional farming systems, but also costs 
associated with accessing and maintaining a presenc in thinly traded organic markets. 
These costs, unless minimised, will discourage conversion to organic agriculture by new 
entrants and discourage those already farming organically. Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) theory has been applied generally to agricultura  commodity and input markets in 
which transaction costs variables are treated as explanatory variables for different types of 
behaviour (Holloway et al., 2000). In other instances, they have been taken as a re ponse 
variable affected by other factors.  
 
Closely connected to collective action is the preval nce of free-riding behaviour among 
group participants, which affects productivity of group members (Kidwell & Bennett, 
1993). Free-riding is a form of opportunistic behaviour found in group institutions 
(Ostrom, 1992b) and is attributed mainly to ill-defin d property rights (Sykuta & Cook, 
2001). Internal free-riding occurs in circumstances where members access benefits without 
fully paying for the costs associated with their creation. Free-riding is relevant to organic 
farming groups as they produce intermediate goods such as storage and public goods like 
product inspection and market access, which are susceptible to free-riding due to limited 
excludability and high rivalry. Free-riding is expect d to be influenced by trust, 
knowledge, household and context variables and groups size; growth in group size 






Ferrara, 2000). Arrangements that ensure proportionality between costs and benefits could 
potentially curb free-riding in groups.  
 
Existence of free-riding could be contextualised within prevailing contractual 
arrangements. Contracts motivate compliant behaviour and enhance contract performance 
by clearly stipulating the allocation of value, risk and decision rights associated with 
business transactions (Bogetoft & Olesen, 2002). Contracts can be analysed using either 
the Incomplete Contract Theory (ICT) or TCE frameworks. ICT is anchored on the hold-up 
problem emphasised by TCE, but discards the concept of bounded rationality. ICT is 
therefore useful in analysing contract structure that minimises ex-ante investment 
inefficiencies (Hart, 1995). The TCE assigns contract incompleteness to bounded 
rationality and views the contract as a tool for addressing ex-ante and ex-post investment 
inefficiencies (Saussier, 200b). In practice, a typical contract should cover the legal 
framework, the contract formula, format, and specifications (Eaton & Sheperd, 2001). 
 
Smallholder farmers encounter varied contractual arr ngements, often verbal and seasonal 
in nature, which influences contract performance (Eaton & Sheperd, 2001). Given that 
agricultural supply contracts are fraught with hold-up, adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, there is need to protect smallholders entering into contractual relationships. 
Little is known about the effectiveness of collective action in reducing transaction costs 
and increasing market access due to limited knowledge about its emergence, sustainability, 
determinants, appropriate institutional arrangements and effective supporting policy 
options (Temu & Temu, 2005). Understanding of collective action is hampered by poor 
understanding of its determinants (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). Lack of comparable data 






influencing collective action. There has been very limited application of TCE to organic 
farming, let alone linking it with collective action to explain continued collective action 
efforts in smallholder organic farming systems. 
 
While acknowledging the positive contribution of collective action towards addressing 
issues of market access by smallholders, there is ned to understand sustainability issues 
because collective action problems differ in severity (Ostrom, 1990; 2000). In situations 
where exclusion is difficult, people free-ride on the efforts, undermining their collective 
efforts. Apart from studies investigating group size effects (Olson, 1965; Albanese & Van 
Fleet, 1985; Rokkan & Buvik, 2003), few attempts have been made to empirically measure 
levels of free-riding or to identify its determinants.  
 
Application of contract theory has been largely theoretical, with some empirical studies 
regressing contract choice on observed farmer and frm characteristics (Ackerberg & 
Botticini, 2002). Analysis of contract provisions has dealt extensively with incentives, 
prices, and price adjustment methods.  This could be because contract theory does not 
provide a unified structure for specifying and testing contract design hypotheses (Masten & 
Saussier, 2000). 
 
1.5 An analytical framework for evaluating institutiona l arrangements in 
organic groups. 
The subject of this study is to better understand a ddress the problems in collective 
action taken by smallholders who wish to exploit market opportunities. The study’s main 
objective is to identify and analyse the following important issues; (1) factors underpinning 






participating in the group effort, (2) measure and quantify the prevalence of internal free-
riding and identify its determinants, (3) assess and investigate the impact of verbal contract 
clauses on contract performance, and identify the determinants of preferred contract 
clauses, and (4) to make policy recommendations that promote the functioning and 
sustainability of organic farming group institutions. 
 
The study relies on the New Institutional Economics (NIE) analytical framework to 
address these issues. NIE, which draws on the strengths of Old Institutional Economics and 
Neoclassical Economics (Nabli & Nugent, 1989), is a deliberate attempt to provide a 
theory of institutions in economics by building on, modifying and extending the 
neoclassical theory. It capitalises on the strengths of neo-classical economics and the old 
institutional economics by providing a theory to explain the existence and operation of 
economic institutions. From a development perspectiv , NIE offers two useful theoretical 
approaches; (a) the theory of transaction and information costs (North, 2000; Stiglitz, 
1985) and, (b) the theory of collective action (Olson, 1965; Sandler, 1992). Two major 
analytical approaches possible within the realm of NIE are that of transaction costs, 
information costs, and contractual choice on one hand, and collective action and 
elimination of free-rider problems on the other (Nable & Nugent, 1989). Despite these 
approaches having evolved separately they hinge on similar frameworks and axioms, and 
are affected by risk expectations and commodity prices and emphasise the role 
governments can play in an economic system.  
 
The study uses EFO as an example to analyse institutional problems faced by smallholders 
who act collectively to market their produce. The us  of EFO is important for a number of 






Africa; second, it provides a unique model of a development intervention that combines 
multiple dimensions of food security, ecological sustainability and market access; and 
third, it offers lessons relevant to EFO and to collective action taken by smallholders 
seeking access to preferred markets. Located in KwaZulu-Natal province, EFO was formed 
in 2001 and received organic certification in 2003. With 151 members, the group produces 
and markets organic produce such as amadumbe (taro), baby potatoes, sweet potatoes, and 
green beans to Woolworths Stores through Assegai Organics, a pack house located in 
Durban.  
 
The study is important because smallholders are often excluded from markets by a host of 
factors including high transaction costs and information asymmetries, and fixed marketing 
costs (like certification fees). Collective action e ables smallholders to acquire group 
certification and so reduce their per unit transaction costs. However, such collective action 
to improve market access is fraught with free-riding and contractual problems that 
potentially threaten its sustainability.  An informed understanding of how EFO developed, 
its institutional arrangements and how these arrangements affect its performance not only 
sheds light on ways to strengthen EFO, but also on theories about institutional 
arrangements purported to alleviate the free-rider and contractual problems that typically 
challenge smallholder marketing groups.  
The specific research questions addressed by this study are as follows: 
(1) Is EFO giving its members access to the organic market by reducing transaction and 






(2) Is EFO’s ability to give smallholders access to a preferred market for organic products 
constrained by internal free-riding? 
(3) Is EFO’s ability to give smallholders access to a preferred market for organic products 
constrained by a poorly designed contract with the buyer?  
 In answering the above research questions, the study uses quantitative data gathered in 
surveys of EFO members and neighbouring non-members’ as well as qualitative 
information gathered in interviews with key informants on EFO’s management committee.  
 
1.6 Outline of the study 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the context of organic 
agriculture in South Africa and looks at the agricultural policies changes implemented 
since 1994. An outline of developments around organic production and marketing and the 
organic trends in South Africa are presented followed by generally agreed definitions of a 
smallholders and smallholder farming group as per International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movement (IFOAM) guidelines. Issues around Internal Control Systems, their 
elements and importance to organic certification are then explored before presenting a case 
study on EFO.  
 
Chapter 3 gives a broad overview of NIE and institutional arrangements, laying the 
foundation for in-depth analysis of theories relevant to the study. In particular, institutional 
economics themes are presented in the context of collective action and related institutional 
problems. Chapter 4 considers collective action theory, specifically the role of collective 






accessing organic markets. The conceptual and measurement issues around collective 
action are explained. 
 
Chapter 5 considers free-riding behaviour in group institutions as one of the problems 
associated with collective efforts. The Chapter then explores free-riding theory in more 
detail including available empirical evidence. Chapter 6 provides the link between contract 
theory and free-riding in group institutions. Contract analytical frameworks availed by 
TCE and ICT are used to explain the role of contractu l arrangements in supply chain 
relationships drawing lessons from existing body of empirical contract studies. Chapter 7 
describes the study area, methods used to collect data, type of data gathered, and then 
postulates the empirical model of collective action f llowed by a discussion of the results. 
Chapter 8 presents the empirical model and associated results on free-riding at EFO, while 
Chapter 9 presents the empirical models and results of contractual arrangements at EFO. 






CHAPTER 2  
ORGANIC AGRICULTURE: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
This Chapter gives an overview of the agricultural sector in South Africa and highlights the 
major agricultural policy changes since 1994. The emerging role of the organic sector is 
explained focusing on observable trends globally and in the South African context. The 
Chapter then presents generally acceptable definitions of ‘smallholders’ and ‘smallholder 
farming group’ as accepted by organic certifying bodies. The role of an Internal Control 
System is explained as it forms the basis for certifica on and ongoing monitoring of the 
group’s compliance with organic standards. Lastly, he Chapter presents EFO as an 
example to illustrate different issues around smallholder group certifications. 
 
2.1 Policy changes in South African agricultural sector 
South Africa’s agricultural economy comprises of a predominantly subsistence oriented 
smallholder sector- the second economy - and a well developed commercial sector- the 
first economy which are structurally disconnected (Department of Agriculture, 2001). 
Advances in first economy do not necessarily benefit the second economy (Mbeki, 2004). 
The agricultural sector has witnessed a series of policy changes since 1994 designed to 
reversing the impact of discriminatory legislation a d liberalising the sector. Essentially, 
agricultural trade has been liberalised and marketing of agricultural products deregulated, 
Subsidies and certain tax concessions were removed, an  minimum wages for farm 







2.2 The emerging role of the organic sector  
Two distinct classes of organic agriculture are observable in Africa, namely certified 
organic production and non-certified or agro-ecological production (Parrott et al., 2006). 
Certified production is earmarked mainly for export markets in Europe and North America, 
while agro-ecological farming is practiced to address challenges faced by smallholders. 
Organic farming is proposed to simultaneously address socio-economic, development and 
environmental objectives. Organic production applies nnovative production methods 
anchored on indigenous knowledge systems developed v r many generations. Organic 
agriculture attempts to manage complex ecosystems in a mutually beneficial way using 
local knowledge to meet household food production requirements, maintain the 
environment and build social reward (Twarog & Kapoor, 2004).  
 
Organic agriculture production and demand has accelerat d over the last few years. The 
share of agricultural land under organic farming continues to grow worldwide. About 120 
countries practise certified agriculture, with even a greater number of farmers engaged in 
uncertified organic farming (Yussefi, 2006). Close to 51 million hectares of land 
worldwide was under organic certification in 2006, of which more than 31 million hectares 
(62% of 51 million hectares) consisted of 622 782 farms. The remaining 20 million 
hectares was under forests and wild harvested plants. The land use pattern of the 31 million 
hectares of certified organic farms includes permanent pastures (30%), arable land (13%), 
and permanent crops (5%), (Yussefi, 2006). While th amount of land under organic 
management differs by country, significant differenc s are evident at continental level. 
Australia/Oceania leads the pack with 39% of the world’s organic land followed by Europe 
with 21% and then Latin America with 20%. Africa has the lowest proportion of 







In 2004, global organic sales amounted to 27.8 Billion United States dollars mainly split 
between North America and Europe (Yussefi, 2006). Asia and Oceania have significantly 
smaller organic markets despite being the largest producers of organic products. Organic 
markets in African countries are largely thin or non existent with the notable exception of 
Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa (Parrott et al., 2006). According to 
Auerbach, (2003 cited by Rundgren 2006), the value of organic sector sales in South 
Africa, both domestic and export, is estimated at between R200 million and R400 million 
per annum, driven by both the commercial and subsistence sectors. 
 
By world standards, the South African organic sector is relatively small. The organic sector 
in South Africa is split between the smallholders and large commercial farmers (Rundgren, 
2006). Certified organic production in South Africa started with exports in vegetables, 
rooibos tea, mangoes, avocados, herbs, spices, tea and subtropical fruit (ITC, 1999; 
Rundgren, 2006). It has since expanded to include a much wider range of products: organic 
wines, olive oil, speciality vegetables and berries, citrus and dairy products have become 
major export commodities (IFOAM, 2003). Different vegetables and culinary herbs form 
the core of the organic produce sold in South Africa itself (Export Promotion of Organic 
Products from Africa, 2006).  
 
The South African organic sector has a long history dating back to the 1970s. The sector 
had about 50 small scale organic farmers in 1990 and the first group of farmers was 
certified by the United Kingdom Soil Association in 1993. Available statistics indicate that 
the number of farms in South Africa converting to organic farming has increased from 35 






by 2002 covering 43 620 hectares, inclusive of pasture  and in-conversion land. Auerbach 
(2001 as cited by Rundgren 2006), reported 291 farms in 2001 covering 200 000 hectares 
consisting of 25 000 hectares of arable certified land. As of 2005, Mead (2005 cited by 
Rundgren 2006), reported 200 farms in 2005 covering 515 000 hectares, of which 500 000 
hectares is pasture and 10 000 hectares rooibos tea and the balance being planted to 
vegetables, wine and essential oils. The lack of consensus on the number of certified farms 
is rather puzzling, but does point to a lack of coordination in the sector. The statistics focus 
on large commercial farms and mask the extent of the communal and substance farmers’ 
involvement in organic farming. South Africa has very few cases of documented 
smallholder organic growers and groups.  
 
South Africa has begun to appreciate the role of organic agriculture in creating incomes 
and generating foreign exchange for the national economy, but like many other African 
states, the non-financial benefits of organic farming are rarely acknowledged and 
recognised. The potential for organic growth in South Africa is huge (Rundgren 2006), not 
only driven by exports, but by a growing substantial domestic organic market unlike in 
many other African states (Grolink, 2002). Many large etail chains are actively promoting 
organic products, particularly those supplied by smallholders who are given very little 
support, but are used extensively in the retailers’ advertising campaigns.  
 
The South African organic sector receives support fr m a number of organisations such as 
African Organic Farming Foundation (AOFF), Centre for the Promotion of Imports from 
Developing Countries (CBI), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), IFOAM, and the 
International Trade Centre (ITC), (Rundgren, 2006). In South Africa, the promotion of 






Africa (OAASA) and the Biodynamic Agricultural Association of South Africa 
(BDAASA) who together provide a network platform for all stakeholders. Other organic 
associations according to Rundgren (2006) are: the Cape Organic Producers’ Association 
focusing on the Western Cape; the Network of Community Organic Farming Associations 
working with smallholders; and the Rainman Landcare Foundation (the only government 
accredited organisation offering training in organic agriculture). These organisations are 
mainly responsible for public relations, teaching and training, publishing, and other 
information dissemination activities (Rundgren, 2006; Parrot et al., 2006) These 
organisations, though working at industry level, are geared towards rendering services to 
the large commercial sector at the expense of smallholders. 
 
South Africa has two certification agencies namely Africa’s Farms Certified Organic 
(AFRISCO) associated with Ecocert, and the Organic Agricultural Association of South 
Africa (OAASA), both of which certify exports to Europe, North America or Japan 
(Parrott et al., 2006). Proposed regulations controlling the sale of organically produced 
food in the Republic of South Africa are being drafted in accordance with the international 
organic standards of IFOAM, European Union and the United States Department of 
Agriculture (Parrott et al., 2006). A draft standard has been produced and is yet to be 
tabled before parliament even though for all practical purposes, it is being used to regulate 
the local organic industry (Rundgren, 2006).  
 
2.3 Smallholder group certification guidelines 
Participation of smallholder farmers in organic farming is only feasible under group 
certifications (IFOAM, 2003). IFOAM (2003) reported the existence of 350 grower groups 






products to the European and North American organic markets. However, it is important to 
clarify the definition of ‘smallholder’ and ‘smallholder group’ as they carry different 
meanings across different countries. 
 
2.3.1 Definition of a smallholder farming group for organic certification purposes 
The term ‘smallholder’ differs between countries and varies from one geographical 
location to another. The majority of sub-Saharan population living in rural areas can be 
considered as smallholders mainly because of their limited resource endowments relative 
to other farmers in the same sector (Dixon et al., 2004). The size of land holdings also 
varies between countries and farming systems and is normally less than one hectare in 
areas with high population densities (FAO, 1997). Despite small farm sizes and poor 
resources endowments having often been regarded as the hallmarks of a smallholder, 
differences also exist with regard to household expenditure pattern, use of external labour, 
resource allocation, cash crop production, livestock wnership, off-farm activities and 
proportion of produce sold (Dixon et al., 2004; FAO, 1997).  
 
In the South African context, smallholders are commonly classified as subsistence, 
emerging, or commercial farmers (van Averbeke & Mohamed, 2006; Department of 
Agriculture, 2001). As a proportion of total farmers in South Africa, subsistence farmers 
are the majority and commercial farmers a minority with emerging farmers, those with a 
desire to produce on a commercial scale, sandwiched in between (Nieuwoudt, 2000). The 
vast majority of South African smallholders come from a historically disadvantaged 
background. Since farm land sizes varies from country to country, IFOAM (2003) 
precludes the use of farm size in defining a smallholder, relying instead on a matrix of 






be classified as a smallholder for organic certification purposes. Table 2.1 also presents the 
criteria used in qualifying a smallholder farming group for certification purposes. Only 
qualifying smallholders are permitted to form an organic smallholder farming group. 
 
Table 2.1: Criteria used by IFOAM to define smallholders and smallholder farming 
groups 
Smallholder criteria* Smallholder farming group crite a 
• Use of low-technology based production 
system 
• Farming system dependent on family 
labour 
• Farmer has limited capacity to market his 
or her own crop 
• Farmer has limited capacity for farm 
administration 
• Farmer has limited capacity to 
communicate in the language of the 
organic certifying agent 
• The farm has limited storage and or 
storage capacity 
• The farm’s average annual income from 
the certified product is below 
approximately 5 000 United States 
dollars taken over a number of years (e.g. 
5 years) 
• The farm would spend over 2 per cent of 
commodity export value on external 
inspection when not certified in a group 
(taken over a number of years e.g. 5 
years). 
 
• The cost of (individual) certification 
must be disproportionately high in 
relation to the sales value of the product 
sold. 
• The farm units are mainly managed by 
family labour. 
• There must be homogeneity of members 
in terms of geographical location, 
production system, size of the holdings, 
and marketing system. 
• No maximum amount of hectares per 
farmer is set. 
• Minimum size of the group is dependent 
on the situation, but must be large 
enough to sustain a viable Internal 
Control System. A practical guideline is 
a minimum of 30 to 50 smallholders per 
group. 
• Maximum size of the group is decided by 
the group and depends on the group’s 
structure, capacity, and communication 
system. It is an element in the risk 
assessment process. 
*The criteria can be adjusted by certification bodies to suit local conditions provided 
sufficient justification is provided for doing so.  
 
According to IFOAM (2003), the smallholder farming group criteria shown in Table 2.1 
must be supplemented with information about the general description of the operator, 
which must define the type of producer organisation (like co-operative, association, 






identifiable under a clear administrative system and there must be a clear relationship 
between the group’s central administration and the smallholders. 
 
2.3.2 Internal Control Systems for certified organic smallholder groups 
The development of systems worldwide by smallholder groups in association with 
certification bodies to ensure compliance with organic standards started long before 
government regulations were introduced. One of the cornerstones of group organic 
certification is the establishment of an Internal Control System. IFOAM (2003:11) gives 
the following definition of an Internal Control System: 
“An Internal Control System is a documented quality assurance system that allows the 
external certification body to delegate the annual inspection of individual group members 
to an identified body/unit within the certified operator. (As a consequence, the main task of 
the certification body is to evaluate the proper working of the Internal Control System.)”  
The Internal Control System must have an operator (legal form), a group production unit 
(for which the operator is responsible) when smallholders produce collectively and a 
farming unit or area, organic and or non-organic for which individual group members are 
responsible when production is done individually. The rationale for an Internal Control 
System is to reduce the cost of organic certification o smallholders by establishing a group 
that can do much of the monitoring itself. Then thecertifier’s job is to ensure that group 
processes and data collection are working well and to check regularly on a sample of the 
farms.  
 
According to IFOAM (2003), the basic elements of an Internal Control System are a 






structure, a responsible manager, internal regulations (production standards, and 
sanctions), conversion rules, a contract between th group and the certification body (e.g. 
AFRISCO at EFO), identified internal inspectors, and training of personnel including the 
manager, internal inspectors, producers and handlers. At household level, growers should 
have formal commitment, field records, and maps for each farm, annual inspection 
protocols, and a farm inspection report/form completed for each farm. An internal approval 
committee evaluates prospective members. The certified group should show a commitment 
to use internal sanctions, keep a regularly updated growers’ list, assess risk, employ 
community surveillance, and document post-harvest procedures, including product flow 
and quantities (IFOAM, 2003). These measures suggest that smallholders will need 
external help in starting up and abiding by the IFOAM requirements. 
 
Of the 5 per cent of agricultural land certified organic in South Africa, the proportion of 
land farmed by smallholders remains unknown (Rundgren, 2006). KwaZulu-Natal, apart 
from being one of the main agricultural provinces of S uth Africa, has also been home to 
the country’s first organic groups known to be eithr fully certified or in the process of 
becoming certified. As of 2004, only a handful of grower organic groups existed such as 
EFO with 151 members, Vukuzakhe Organic Farmers Organisation (VOFO) with 40 
members and Makhuluseni Organic Farmers Organisation (MOFO) with 41 members, all 
in KwaZulu-Natal. Northern Cape has Heiveld Co-operative with 42 members growing 
rooibos tea individually. EFO was established in 2001, while VOFO and MOFO were both 
established in 2003. EFO members produce independently, but market collectively, 







2.4 EFO case study 
EFO remains central to the study of organic groups in South Africa as it marks the entry 
point of subsistence farmers into mainstream organic farming. The project has generated 
significant interest from government, academia, andbusiness as a model for sustainable 
economic development. EFO is located in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Communal 
areas account for 31% of the province’s total land area and are characterised by 
smallholders practising low output subsistence agriculture (Matungul, 2001). Nevertheless, 
agriculture remains an important livelihood for many rural families, contributing a 
significant portion of their household income.  
 
EFO is located in the Embo area of the former Umbumb lu magisterial district and 
consists of five traditional authorities: Embo, Embo-Kwakhabazela, Embo-NkishisiMahla, 
Embo-Timuni and Embo-Vumakwenza. Following recent changes in district municipal 
boundaries, Embo is now at the confluence of four magisterial districts; Ugu, eThekwini, 
Sisonke, and Umgungundlovu. The area has been describ d by the Centre for HIV and 
AIDS Networking (HIVAN) as rural with rugged topography and surrounded by 
commercial sugar-cane producers. Households are scattered over the deep hills and valleys 
(HIVAN, 2002). 
 
The Embo area is governed by a traditional authority and traditional authority wards form 
part of municipality and magisterial districts. Embo has a population of 160 755 people 
(Municipal Demarcation Board, 2001). The major economic activities in order of 
decreasing importance are agriculture, manufacturing, social services and transportation 
(HIVAN, 2002). The community has limited access to communication, electricity and 






Prof  Albert Modi of University of KwaZulu-Natal secured a R28 000 grant in year 2000 
from the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology to run workshops on 
‘Public Understanding of Science Engineering and Technology’ at Umbumbulu, 
conscientising farmers on the value of indigenous and traditional crops, with a view to 
identifying research and rural development opportunities. This process culminated in the 
formation of EFO. EFO was formally founded in February 2001 by Prof Albert Modi and a 
group of 28 subsistence farmers from Ogagwini interested in growing traditional 
vegetables. The organisation, a loose association of smallholders driven by an ambition to 
succeed, was formed to address marketing problems experi nced by farmers. Prof Albert 
Modi, a seed specialist from the then University of Natal worked closely with the farmers 
to improve their farming methods and product quality. The traditional vegetables, 
especially amadumbe (taro) were supplied to Pick ‘n Pay for about two years before 
Woolworths came on board. Over the years, the organisation’s membership has grown 
drawing its membership from seven locations including Ogagwini. Attempts to get EFO 
registered as a co-operative have been unsuccessful.  
 
Prof Albert Modi and Dr James Hartzell of Assegai Organics assisted the farmers in 
initiating the certification process by preparing required documentation for organic group 
certification and developing market for the organic produce. Due to the group’s successes, 
other stakeholders came on board. The KwaZulu-Natal Department of Economic 
Development and Tourism provided farmers with fencing material and AFRISCO 
conducted EFO’s first year certification in 2003 on a pro-bono basis making EFO the first 







In 2004, the group’s membership stood at 151 consisti g of 48 fully certified and 103 
partially certified farmers. Fully certified farmers were those who had met all the 
certification requirements and consisted mainly of founding members. Partially certified 
farmers were those in the conversion stage. These are farmers who applied to join the 
group later, had fulfilled all the certification requirements for group certification, but were 
waiting for a certification decision by the certifying body, AFRISCO. 
 
The promoters of EFO were inspired by the members’ determination to succeed and to use 
their lack of access to mechanisation, fertilisers, hybrid seeds, pesticides and herbicides as 
a case for group certification. A new model for rural development was being pioneered. 
While the original focus was on producing traditional vegetables (old varieties passed from 
generation to generation), EFO now produces amadumbe (taro), sweet potatoes, baby 
potatoes and green beans. These crops are retailed in Woolworths stores around the 
country.  
 
EFO has open membership and egalitarian voting rights. In essence, any new member 
interested in joining the organisation is free to dso provided all the qualifying 
requirements as stipulated in the groups’ constitution are met. The organisation has no 
share ownership scheme for its members. The organisation is managed by a management 
committee made up of the chairman and vice chairman, secretary and deputy secretary, 
treasurer, and three committee members elected from the floor. The management 
committee also acts as a board of directors providing overall strategic guidance and 
exercising control over the organisation assets and resources. EFO holds mandatory 
monthly member meetings usually at the beginning of each month to share information and 






There is one independent committee that reports to he management committee known as 
the certification committee. The certification committee is made up of elected members 
from the general membership. Its function is to process applications from potential new 
members, deal with compliance issues of existing members and make recommendations to 
the management committee in cases of non-compliance with organic rules. It also provides 
an oversight role over the internal inspectors.  
 
The group has an established Internal Control System. An Internal Control System is 
originally developed to assist smallholders in marketing, record keeping and 
communicating with the certifier and competent authori ies. EFO has eight internal 
inspectors whose role is to monitor member’s compliance with organic standards and to 
report any transgressions to the certification committee for disciplinary hearing and 
sanctioning. Violation of organic standards by a single member may result in the revoking 
of the group’s organic certificate. Inspectors, paid for by the organisation, help to reduce 
the annual inspection bill from certification agenci s as the group does most of the 
monitoring itself. 
 
EFO farmers own individual plots under a communal land tenure system. Each member 
carries out crop production individually and is responsible for all farming operations on his 
or her plot. These include land preparation, procuring inputs, planting, crop maintenance, 
harvesting and grading. During this production phase, internal inspectors monitor the 
members to ensure compliance with organic production principles. When it comes to 
marketing, following a call from the buyer for deliveries to begin, farmers bring 
marketable produce to designated delivery points throughout the villages, where it is 






house. The pack house records the weights again agast each supplying member’s name 
but pools the produce before grading in order reduc grading costs. Farmers, in essence, 
are paid for the weight of their produce regardless of the amount that is rejected. 
 
The marketing contract is essentially a gentlemen’s agreement between the pack house and 
EFO. At the beginning of each marketing season negotiations are held between the pack 
house and EFO to set produce prices. These effectively become the ruling prices 
throughout the marketing season. The pack house maks calls to farmers for deliveries to 
begin, and stipulates the amount and type of product to be supplied. Payments for produce 
delivered are made twice every month. The buyer commits to buy produce quantities of 
acceptable quality as indicated in his call for deliveries. Each EFO member is given an 
equal quota to supply the pack house, but this is adjusted upwards if some members are 
unable to fulfill their quotas. 
 
The members still face a number of challenges as organic farmers. Access to clean and 
disease free seed is a problem. The increasing number of farmers going organic has 
increased the demand for kraal and compost manure and sometimes for fertilizers and 
other inputs, which are expensive. Not all of the farmers have knowledge about organic 
farming and access to such information is limited. Information about prices in the organic 
sector is proprietary which constrain smallholders’ ability to identify profitable marketing 







2.4.1 Relevance of EFO example   
EFO members have reported increased crop yields and revenues from organic sales, which 
could potentially attract new members. It remains to be seen whether or not the group will 
withstand the pressure associated with an expanding group size in the medium to long 
term. As the first successful case of organic group certification, EFO is used as an example 
to understand the constraints facing similar collectiv  action groups and to draw lessons 
needed to inform EFO, stakeholders in the local organics industry and policies and 
strategies to integrate smallholders in to niche markets. 
 
2.5 Chapter summary  
South Africa has dual agricultural economy made up of a commercially oriented large 
scale farming sector and a predominantly rural smallholder sector. The agricultural sector 
has undergone transformation that resulted in the lib ralisation of agricultural trade, 
removal of control boards, subsidies and tax concession, introduction of land reform 
programmes and minimum farm wages. This is similar to developments that have taken 
place earlier in the sub region.  
 
Organic agriculture worldwide is experiencing rapid growth in terms of the amount of 
certified land and global organics sales. Organic sales are largely driven by increased 
consumer demand for organic foods by North American and European consumers. Africa’s 
contribution, both in terms of certified land and organic sales, is still relatively small 
compared to other continents. South Africa has a smll proportion of its total agriculture 
land under organic agriculture, but figures point to an encouraging upward trend in terms 
of numbers of certified farms and certified land over the last decade driven by large 






country’s total organically certified land and organic sales is still not clear. The country’s 
major organic export crops are rooibos tea, tropical and sub-tropical fruit, wines, herbs, 
spices and vegetables. The South African organic sector has received support from many 
organisations and currently the country has two certification agencies responsible for 
certifying local and export organic produce, despite the lack of national organic standards 
and regulations that are awaiting approval by the South African parliament.   
 
Smallholders can only play a meaningful role in organic farming and marketing if they 
meet the definition and six of the criteria stipulated by IFOAM as minimum requirements 
for group certification. Land size is not an acceptable criterion for defining a smallholder 
farmer and is excluded from the IFOAM criteria. In order to get organic certification, 
smallholders must establish a viable Internal Control System that assists in monitoring 
group members’ compliance with organic standards. South Africa has a few cases of 
documented organic groups of which EFO is one. EFO, established in 2001 and certified in 
2003, is used as an example to understand institutional problems and sustainability issues 
around collective action taken by smallholders in an attempt to access higher value niche 
markets. It is the first group of subsistence farmers to be certified in South Africa and 
supplies the local organic market through Woolworths. It is therefore an important 
example of collective action from which lessons canbe extracted to inform theories about 
institutional arrangements designed to mitigate fre-rider and contractual problems facing 








CHAPTER 3  
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIC FARMING GRO UPS 
This Chapter provides a broad overview of the NIE framework generally used in 
conceptualising institutional problems and lays the foundation for the analysis of major 
themes relevant to the study of farmer organisations such as collective action, free-riding, 
and contractual arrangements. Since these three themes invariably revolve around 
institutions, a working definition of the term ‘institution’ is explored together with the 
study’s conceptualisation of institutional arrangements in smallholder groups. The last 
section of the chapter describes common institutional problems encountered in farmer 
organisations with ill-defined property rights struct res and highlights those that are 
relevant to the study of organic groups. 
 
3.1 An overview of the New Institutional Economics 
The purpose of NIE is to explain the operations of institutions, their development over time 
and how they impact on economic development (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). Williamson 
(1979; 1985; 2000) refined the Coasian arguments about property rights and transaction 
costs and coined the phrase ‘New Institutional Economics’. NIE is distinct from old 
institutional economics developed by Commons and Veblen (Paarlberg, 1993) in that old 
institutional economics operated outside neoclassicl e onomics and had no theory apart 
from postulating that institutions were a key factor in explaining and influencing economic 
behaviour. Neoclassical economics, which presumes perfect information, zero transaction 
costs, and full rationality, as some of its underlying assumptions ignored the role of 
institutions and failed to explain why markets fail. NIE combines the core competencies of 






analytical framework with theory and institutions in which institutions are included as 
additional constraint. It is important to note that most of the key assumptions of 
neoclassical economics are relaxed except the assumption of atomistic, self-profit 
maximising individuals (Mathews, 1986). 
 
According to Williamson, (2000), NIE operates at boh macro and micro levels of society. 
The macro level deals with higher levels of analysis such as the policy environment that 
affects the behaviour and performance of economic actors and in which organisational 
forms and transactions are rooted. The micro level analysis deals with arrangements that 
govern transactions and includes market, quasi-market and hierarchical modes of 
contracting. Micro level analysis focuses on indiviual transactions and organisational 
forms. At this level, institutions are arrangements between economic agents that govern the 
ways in which they can cooperate and/or compete (Sauvee, 1998; Kherallah & Kirsten, 
2001). It is at the micro level that NIE is relevant to the study of organic farming groups. 
 
3.2 Themes in New Institutional Economics 
NIE is by definition a multidisciplinary field of study made up of several branches. 
Broadly it comprises of new economic history (North, 1990), public choice and political 
economy (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965; 1982), new social economics (Putman, 
1993), transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; 1960; North, 1990; 2000; Williamson, 
1985; 2000), theory of collective action (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982; Sandler, 1992: 19), 
and law and economics (Posner, 1984). The transaction ost economics branch spans three 
sub-branches of economics of information (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz, 1985), property rights 
(Hart & Moore, 1990), and social capital (Putman, 1993). The social capital sub-branch is 






collective action, free-riding, and contract theoris can be used to analyse organic farming 
institutions and is explored further in subsequent chapters. 
 
3.3 Institutions and institutional arrangements defined 
The term ‘institution’ has been the most controversial in the realm of NIE. Different 
definitions have emerged overtime, each emphasising quite different aspects of a more 
general phenomenon. The characteristics of institutions that vary are the degree to which 
they are (a) organisational, (b) formal, (c) created at a specific time and place for a specific 
purpose, (d) embedded in other institutions, (e) universal in the interests they serve, (f) 
creating a public good and (g) technology linked (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). Schotter, (1981) 
views institutions as regularity in social behaviour that is agreed to by all members of 
society, specifies behaviour in specific recurrent situations, and is either self-policed or 
policed by some external authority.  
 
Heiner (1983) adopts a similar ‘social’ definition, as does Uphoff (1986) who sees 
institutions as complexes of norms of behaviour that persist over time by serving 
collectively valued purposes. However, there are other definitions, which emphasise the 
rules aspect of institutions. These include the view that institutions are rules that structure 
repeated human interaction (North, 1997). The commonly agreed ‘economic’ definition of 
institutions is that which defines them as a set of formal rules (laws, contracts, political 
systems, organisations, markets, and informal rules of conduct (norms, traditions, customs, 
value systems, religions, sociological trends) that facilitate coordination or govern 
relationships between individuals or groups (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2001). This is consistent 






of organisations that facilitate coordination among people by helping them form 
expectations that each person can reasonably hold in dealing with others. 
 
Despite these differences, most definitions appear to have three basic characteristics. The 
first characteristic is the ‘rules and constraints’ nature of institutions, which Ostrom (1986) 
defined as prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of participants to order 
repetitive, interdependent relationships. The second characteristic of institutions is the 
ability of their ‘rules and constraints’ to govern relations between individuals and groups. 
The third characteristic of institutions is their predictability (applicable in repeated and 
future situations). This study treats formal organis tions, markets, contracts, cultural rules 
and codes of conduct as institutions in the framework of NIE.  
 
NIE provides two general approaches for analyzing istitutions. These are transaction 
costs, information costs and contractual choice on one hand, and collective action and 
elimination of free-rider problems on the other (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). The transaction 
costs and information costs approach has three sub-themes. The first sub-theme examines 
the role of transaction costs in influencing transaction decisions. The second sub-theme 
uses a property rights approach (Coase, 1960) to explain how technological and other 
conditions (including externalities) relate to property rights, and the evolution of 
institutional mechanisms for internalising benefits and costs (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). 
Property rights are linked to transaction costs because secure property rights reduce 
transaction costs and therefore improve market effici ncy. The third sub-theme is that of 
incomplete information, and asymmetries in information in particular. The three sub-
themes evolved separately but are related as information problems are a source of 






For example, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection arise in contracts where 
asymmetries of information are present. Nabli and Nugent (1998) argue that information 
asymmetry is closely related to opportunistic behavior and transaction costs. Information 
asymmetry and information systems impact on the structu e and productivity of principal-
agent relationships. When a principal has information o verify agent behavior, the agent is 
more likely to behave in the best interests of the principal. The principal can curb free-
riding by investing in information systems to verify behavior. The economics of 
transaction costs and costly information have acknowledged the existence of the agency 
problem in contractual arrangements (Williamson, 1985). 
 
The other general approach of NIE concerns collectiv  action and the elimination of free-
rider problems in the provision of collective goods. Collective action may take varied 
forms, but its drivers seemingly encounter more or less similar problems that may lead to 
dissipation of momentum and eventually its demise. For example, most communal projects 
are organised around conventional cooperatives, as opposed to new generation 
cooperatives, and are fraught with free-riding problems, horizon, portfolio, and control and 
influence problems. Even though these approaches of NIE (transaction costs, information 
costs, and contractual choice, on one hand, and collective action and elimination of free-
rider problems on the other) have developed separately, they are in fact related. Firstly, 
they are based on similar frameworks and axioms. Secondly both are affected by factors 
such as risk expectations and commodity prices. Thirdly, they emphasise the role of 
government (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). The following sections discuss institutional nature of 







3.4 Institutional problems confronting organic farming groups 
Cooperation between small farmers and the governance of supply chains present important 
opportunities for contract farming to link smallholders and agribusiness firms in the high 
value organic market chain (Kirsten & Sartorius, 200 ). There are many reasons why 
farmers resort to collective action. Among them areth  need to reduce risks, increase 
market share, increase marketing margins and profitability, create jobs, resist opportunism 
and hold up situations, reduce transaction costs and substitute for missing or imperfect 
markets (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999).  
 
It is feasible that some of these problems prompted th  formation of organic farming 
groups in KwaZulu-Natal such as the EFO, in accordance with guidelines set by the 
IFOAM. The formation of organic producer groups would greatly reduce the buyer’s 
transaction costs who would otherwise have to administer small contracts to a large group 
of farmers. Consequently, collective action (e.g., through traditional farmer cooperatives) 
does not have a good record of success owing to inadequate property rights that entrench 
free-rider problems (Knight et al., 2003). A traditional cooperative is one characterised by 
the Rochdale principles; for example, net margins distributed according to patronage, 
democratic control (one member one vote), limited rturn on stock, restrictions on the 
number of shares owned, open membership, and shares tr ded at par-value so members 
cannot internalise capital gains (Roy, 1964). 
 
Local organic farming groups have constitutions, which outline the organisation’s 
objectives, general membership rules and the composition and roles of the executive 
committee and internal approval committee. The structure and content of the constitution 






an example, its original constitution makes it a loose marketing association of its members 
organised along the lines of a conventional marketing cooperative.  
 
In general, the constitutions of organic farming groups do not guard against the problems 
common to conventional cooperatives. EFO’s constitution does not explain adequately the 
articles of its business, membership application procedures, responsibilities of its members, 
grounds and procedures for a member’s expulsion, coduct of meetings and auditing 
requirements. Nor does it adequately define members’ voting and benefit rights. Given 
such ill-defined property rights, it is impossible for members to fully internalise the 
benefits of their investments of time and money in negotiating and complying with 
contracts, or in improving services and facilities. A number of cooperative theory scholars 
have conceded that traditional cooperatives are plagued by institutional problems in the 
form of free-rider problems, portfolio problems, horiz n problems, control problems and 
influence problems. These problems emanate from ill-defined property rights when 
designing organisations (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999).  
 
A free-rider problem exists when the gains from cooperative action can be accessed by 
individuals who did not fully invest in developing the gains, for example, new members 
who acquire the same rights as initial investors without paying the appreciated price for 
their shares (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; Sykuta & Cook, 2001). This happens because 
shares must be traded at par value, and not market value.  As a result, new members obtain 
the same patronage and residual rights as existing members and are entitled to the same 






The horizon problem occurs when residual claims on the net income generated by an asset 
are shorter than the economic life of the underlying asset and are not transferable (Porter & 
Scully, 1987). This creates a disincentive to invest in opportunities that create growth, such 
as research and development. Instead, board members are under pressure to increase cash 
flow devoted to current payments and equity redemption at the expense of retained 
earnings (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999). In the case of l cal organic farming groups, 
membership rights are not tradable, and so discourage members from investing in long-
term and intangible assets (like a brand name) needed for the organisation to grow. New 
members become free-riders as they benefit from investments made by founding members 
without paying for them. 
 
The portfolio problem can be viewed as another equity acquisition problem (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Without transferability mechanisms, residual claims cannot be 
exchanged to reflect the risk attitudes of any given member, i.e., members cannot 
restructure their investment portfolios to reflect their own risk preferences i.e. they become 
forced-riders (Knight et al., 2003). The control problem relates to the cost thamembers 
incur in monitoring managers to ensure that they act in the best interest of members 
(Staatz, 1987). The control problem also arises because share prices are fixed at par-value 
and therefore do not provide members with information about managerial performance. 
This is compounded by the fact that organic farming groups lack management information 
systems within their organisation’s management structu e.  
 
Influence problems are common when decisions affect the distribution of wealth among 
members and members have equal voting rights (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). Egalitarian voting 






bulk of the capital. The diffusion of voting power may result in exploitation of large 
lenders and investors by a majority of risk-averse members who contribute relatively little 
capital. An attempt in the United of States America to address these problems has led to 
the rise of New Generation Cooperatives similar to investor-owned firms (Sykuta & Cook, 
2001) with well-defined property rights proportional to individual investment. In South 
Africa and Western European countries, where subsidies have been withdrawn from 
cooperatives, there has been outright conversion of co peratives to company status (Knight 
et al., 2003). All these problems have relevance to EFO. This study focuses on those that 
lead to free-riding. 
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
NIE draws on the strengths of the old institutional and neo-classical economics in its 
attempt to explain the functioning and impact of institutions. It relaxes most of the 
neoclassical economics assumptions except that of atomistic self-maximising individuals. 
NIE operates at both the macro and micro levels. The macro-level analysis deals with 
policy issues and their impact on economic actors, whereas micro-level analysis deals with 
arrangements that govern transactions between economic actors such as contracts. NIE has 
many themes including transaction costs economics and collective action and their sub-
branches, which revolve around institutions. NIE provides two general approaches for 
analysing institutions of transaction costs, information costs, and contractual choice on one 
hand, and collective action and elimination of free- ider problems on the other. Despite 
differences over the meaning of institutions, there is agreement that institutions are rules 
and constraints that govern relations between indivduals and groups in a predictable 






organic groups, which are themselves institutions su ceptible to institutional challenges 






CHAPTER 4  
COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY 
The adoption of sustainable environmentally friendly production methods would help 
smallholders to access higher value markets. However, small producers must first group 
themselves into identifiable structures and apply for group certification. This Chapter 
considers the theoretical foundations for collective action by smallholder farmers growing 
organic crops in an attempt to counter production, marketing and transaction costs 
constraints prevalent in the organic sector. Lessons are extracted from the general field of 
natural resources management that are relevant to the study of collective action in organic 
groups. To give context to the role of collective action in reducing transaction costs and 
information asymmetry problems in the organic sector, theoretical and empirical TCE is 
presented and its link with the organic sector explained. The Chapter then concludes by 
comparing benefits and costs experienced by organic d non-organic farmers. In short, 
this Chapter provides a platform for evaluating thesustainability of EFO’s collective 
marketing efforts in the presence of production, marketing and transaction costs 
constraints.  
 
4.1 Improving smallholder access to organic markets 
There is a growing interest in developing and develop d countries to improve the 
livelihoods of poor smallholders facing production a d marketing constraints in fresh 
produce supply chains (Acquah & Masanzu, 1997). Technological advances have long 
been mooted as a panacea for problems affecting smallholders. Numerous studies have 
investigated factors affecting adoption of new and improved technologies, institutions, and 






Organic agriculture requires a management system that enhances biodiversity, biological 
cycles and soil biological activity with minimal use of off-farm inputs, and which promotes 
practices that restore, maintain and improve ecological harmony (NOSB, 1995). Organic 
agriculture represents the most regulated form of agriculture as it adheres to legally defined 
standards and norms of production, processing, and labeling. A shift to organic agriculture 
by farmers therefore encompasses ecological, agronomic, economic (farm income, markets 
and food security), social, and institutional dimensio s (Scialabba, 1999) and requires that 
individual farmers participate in collective production and marketing activities in one form 
or another. 
 
4.2 Collective action theory   
Numerous definitions of collective action have emerged over time. Marshall (1988) defines 
collective action as action taken by a group, either directly or on its behalf, through an 
organisation in pursuit of members’ shared interests. In some studies, collective action is 
defined in terms of the effort that must be made by two or more individuals to accomplish 
an outcome (Sandler, 1992:19). Most definitions agree that collective action requires 
involvement of a group of people with shared interest in some common action directed 
towards achieving the shared interest (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001). Additionally, these 
definitions implicitly assume that there is some degre  of collective decision-making in the 
pursuit of members’ shared interests.  
 
However, many studies on collective action have focused on Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management, analysing the performance of group management institutions 
(Lele, 2000). Successful collective action has been vi wed as largely dependent on the 






Smallholders in South Africa are not new to collective action, but collective action in 
certified organic groups is a relatively new development, dealing with a different set of 
rules and niche products in highly specific markets and supply chains. 
 
Recognised as an important component of rural development and local natural resource 
management, collective action, remains a difficult issue to measure and analyse 
empirically (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Differences exist over appropriate measures of 
collective action and underlying success factors (Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000). Place et 
al. (2002) alludes to the lack of standardised measures o  indicators for measuring the 
existence, viability and effectiveness of collective action.  
 
In natural resource management, the major thrust ha been to understand and solve 
problems created by the so called ‘tragedy of the commons’.  For example, uncontrolled 
communal grazing has caused degradation of grazing lands in many developing countries 
(Grebremedhin et al., 2004). Privatisation, state ownership, and imposition of use rules by 
external forces as alternative governance mechanism have limited appeal as enforcement 
costs could be prohibitively high and users have incentives to shirk (Wade, 1988). 
Collective action supported by relevant institutions has a far greater chance of succeeding 
in improving natural resource management (Pender, 1999; Rasmusen & Meinzen-Dick, 
1995). 
 
Not withstanding measurement problems and differences over what constitute collective 
action success factors, valuable lessons can be extracted from these natural resources 
management studies that have wider application to other fields of study such as collective 






the necessary condition of transferring user and decision rights to local communities 
through establishment of rules and regulations and enforcing them was satisfied, and where 
rules and regulations were effectively observed (Turner et al., 1994). In organic 
agriculture, IFOAM has established rules and regulations governing certification of 
smallholder organic groups and has devolved their implementation to individual groups 
through the establishment of an Internal Control System. The Internal Control System is 
established, managed, and observed by the group members themselves.  
 
4.3 Collective action in organic groups 
When markets fail due to imperfect information and high transaction costs, horizontal 
coordination can promote participation in local markets and competition in wider markets. 
One approach taken to improve smallholder access to organic markets has been the 
formation of certified organic groups using IFOAM guidelines and enforced by 
certification agencies such as AFRISCO in the case of South Africa. Under the group 
certification system, organic farmers can either grow and market their produce collectively 
or produce individually but market collectively. In either case, group certification requires 
that farmers engage in collective action. 
 
It is estimated that in 2001 there were 350 different organic groups found in less developed 
countries with an estimated 150 000 membership and exporting about 70% of the volume 
of products imported into Europe (IFOAM, 2003). The number of organic groups and 
smallholders participating in certified organic farming in South Africa is unclear, but only 
a few organic groups are known. These export markets (including local South African 
organic market) pay premium prices, which impact positively on the livelihoods of the 






farmers are ordinarily grouped or group themselves into an association or co-operative that 
has legal status and apply for a group certification. The certification of organic groups has 
come a long way. According to IFOAM (2003), in the mid-eighties, certification was 
granted on the basis that a group was organised, an inter al support structure was present, 
and a de facto inspection was in place. 
 
IFOAM began to regulate this certification process in 1996. Given the confusion around 
certification criteria, differences of what constitu e an Internal Control System and around 
the definition of a smallholders and smallholder farming group, IFOAM commissioned 
workshops in 2001, 2002, and 2003 to reach consensu on these contentious issues. While 
the IFOAM guidelines provide common understanding of the issues at stake, it is clear that 
farmers must organise themselves and be able to maintain a robust Internal Control System 
as explained in preceding sections. This demands that they engage in collective action 
during the formative and group maintenance stages, processes that have the potential to 
impose additional costs on the farmers who have decided to adopt organic farming 
systems. 
 
4.4 Determinants of collective action 
Literature on collective action has focused mainly on theory identifying and explaining 
factors that promote or discourage effective collectiv  action (Olson, 1965: 166; Ostrom, 
1992a; Sandler, 1992:19). Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) contend that emergence of collective 
action is a complex phenomenon. However, it is conceivable that individual behaviour 
with respect to collective action is influenced by costs and benefits of participation (Matta 
& Alavalapati, 2006).  Consequently, the evaluation of determinants of collective action in 






light on the collective action challenges faced by smallholders converting to organic 
production system. 
 
There is a broad consensus in contemporary NIE literature that successful collective action 
hinges on four classes of determinants: the characteristic of the collective action problem; 
the attributes of the group (members and non-members); the attributes of the institutional 
arrangements and external influences (Sekher, 2001). Adams et al. (2003) contend that 
differences in community members’ knowledge and understanding of collective action are 
due to differing perceptions of the problem and of the best solution to address it. Heltberg 
(2001) attributes such differences to structural differences such as age, education, gender, 
occupation, values, beliefs, ideas, and economic status. With regard to the benefits and 
costs of participating in a certified organic farming group like EFO, members are expected 
to gain from economies of size that accrue to both farmers and service providers (who 
avoid coordinating or dealing with a plethora of individual clients) in marketing and 
training. Importantly, unit certification and monitoring costs fall because certification 
agencies need only conduct sample inspections rather than inspections of all farmers 
(Damiani, 2003). To better understand the theoretical underpinnings of the production and 
transaction costs faced in the organic sector, a brief evaluation of the transaction cost 
theory and its application in general and to the organic industry specifically is important. 
 
4.5 Transaction cost theory and its application 
TCE builds on the original propositions by Coase (1937) that firms and markets are 
alternative governance structures that differ in their transaction costs. In order for 
economic activities to take place there must be an exchange of goods or services and 






costs are simply the cost of carrying out a transfer o  goods between technically separate 
phases of production or distribution, or simply the cost of carrying out an exchange of 
goods and services. The presence of transaction costs is reflected by the difference or 
discrepancy between buying and selling prices (De Janvry et al., 1991). If sellers 
experience low prices they are discouraged from supplying, and when buyers experience 
high prices they are discouraged from buying, thereby causing market failure. 
 
According to Coase (1937) and Key t al. (2000), transaction costs consist of ex-ante and 
ex-post costs. Ex-ante costs are largely fixed costs including the expense of searching for 
trading partners, specifying the product to be traded, negotiating price and contractual 
terms, monitoring the compliance of contractual partners, enforcing the contract, and 
collecting damages when partners fail to observe their contractual obligations (Eggertson, 
1990: 15; Hobbs, 1997). Jaffee and Morton (1994) identified legal, extra legal and physical 
constraints on the movement and transfer of goods, including handling costs, inspection 
costs, storage costs, and transport costs as source of transaction costs. Ex-post transaction 
costs are mainly variable costs incurred after the contract has been signed, but before the 
entire contract is completed. These include risks of late delivery, non-delivery and 
nonpayment, and the costs of monitoring quality (Casson & Wadeson, 1998).  
 
There are two approaches to the study of transaction osts (Hirsh et al., 1996). The first 
approach involves taking the transaction costs as explanatory factors for certain behaviour 
(Williamson, 2000), whereas the second approach views transaction costs as a response 
variable affected by a range of factors (North, 1990). Since transaction costs are sometimes 
unobservable, a good number of authors have used house ld characteristics to 






al., 1991; Goetz, 1992) as well as commodity specific (Delgado, 1999; Grosh, 1994). 
Several studies have investigated the role of transaction costs in agricultural output and 
input markets. Goetz (1992) and Key t al. (2000), have showed the effect of transaction 
costs on output markets. Goetz (1992) studied household food marketing behaviour using 
proxy variables for transaction costs such as cart ownership, distance to market and 
regional dummy variables. The study found that better access to information significantly 
raised probabilities of market participation. In another study, Key at al., (2000) found that 
participation in maize markets was affected by both fixed and variable transaction costs. 
Variable transaction costs were more significant in selling rather than buying decisions. 
 
Hobbs (1997) studied the importance of transaction c sts in the choice of marketing 
channels for cattle. The study revealed that some transaction costs such as grade 
uncertainty, risk of not selling and time spent at the auction floors were significant 
variables affecting the choice of either live-ring auction or direct-to-packer sales. In an 
earlier study, Hobbs (1996) investigated the effect of transaction costs on the supply 
channel chosen by United Kingdom beef processors. She found that choice of supply 
channel was influenced by traceability of cattle back to the farm, the extent of cattle 
handling from farm to abattoir, payment on dead weight carcass grade, and length of 
relationship with a regular supplier. In their study of costs of contract enforcement in hog 
markets, Beckmann and Boger (2003) found ‘value of relationship’ to be a significant 
determinant of the level of losses a farmer is willing to accept before enforcing a contract 
through the courts. 
 
A limited number of studies have examined the role of transaction costs in South Africa. 






by small farm households KwaZulu-Natal. Using an index of variables for gender, 
education, length of residency, presence of migrant workers, ownership of car and a district 
dummy, high transaction costs were identified as prohibiting access to credit markets. 
Matungul (2001) later explored linkages between trasaction cost factors and marketing 
activities in two districts of the same province. Makhura (2001) investigated the effect of 
transaction costs on household decisions to participa e in agricultural markets in the 
Northern Province. Karaan (1999) described the transaction costs associated with mussel 
mariculture in Saldhana Bay. The study identified agricultural franchising as the most 
effective form of vertical coordination that minimised transaction costs. 
 
4.6 Transaction cost theory and the organic sector 
There is not much literature dealing with the application of transaction cost economics to 
organic farming (MacInnis, 2004). Transaction costs of elling in organic markets may be 
relatively high because organic markets are thin, ad necessary institutions and 
infrastructure are not yet fully developed, even in developed countries (MacInnis, 2004). 
MacInnis (2004) applied the transaction cost approach in analysing choice of organic 
marketing channels by farmers in the United States of America. The study found strong 
empirical evidence that existing organic retail and wholesale markets impose considerable 
barriers to entry for individual organic farmers, and that the effects of transaction costs are 
asymmetrical between farmers who transitioned from c nventional farming and those who 
did not with the later facing higher transaction costs. 
 
For smallholders that traditionally use few inorganic i puts in production, decisions to join 
and to continue participating in a certified organic institutions or groups are influenced 






they face both production and marketing constraints rooted in ill-defined property rights 
and high transaction costs (Lyne, 1996). North (1990:3) defines institutions as human 
devised constraints that shape human interactions and ultimately affect the performance of 
an economy through their effects on exchange and pro uction costs. In the context of 
organic groups, institutions that effectively reduce production and transaction costs 
constraints are more likely to endure. Adopting North’s (1990) broad definition of total 
production costs as made up of transformation costs (costs of operating inputs; land, labour 
and capital) and transaction costs (costs of defining, protecting and enforcing property 
rights), participation in an organic group imposes ongoing costs, including opportunity 
costs and risk, on members. Some of the more pervasive costs of collective action include 
time spent at meetings, negotiating and complying with rules, and providing information to 
the organisation (Doner & Schneider, 2000). 
 
A model of transaction costs typically faced by organic farmers, farmers in transition, and 
conventional farmers is presented in Figure 2.1. Household characteristics and incentives 
created by organic farming groups may cause transaction osts to differ across farming 
households (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006). In addition to general transaction costs faced by 
smallholders under conventional farming systems, Figure 2.1 illustrates that farmers who 
convert from conventional to organic practices must contend with fixed costs of 
certification and compliance, establishing new market channels, maintaining product 
identity, learning about organic farming, and the opp rtunity cost of abandoning crops that 















Figure 4.1: Benefits and production/transaction cost  for a representative farm 
Source: Promar International, 1999. 
Productivity levels may decline and existing capital improvements may have little impact 
on organic output due to rotational constraints, hand weeding, and cover crops that are 
labour intensive (Damiani, 2003). Together, these production and transaction costs act as a 
disincentive for conventional farmers to adopt organic systems, and - considering the 
repetitive nature of significant costs such as compliance and certification costs - for 
adopters to continue with these systems.  
 
On the one hand, smallholders face high fixed production and transactions costs relative to 
income when accessing markets individually owing to their small surpluses. It follows that 
small farmers incur high unit transport, information, and monitoring costs. On the other 
hand, collective action to dilute these fixed production and transaction costs introduces 
other costs and is often hampered by problems such as free-riding when farmer groups 







Additional learning and marketing costs 
Additional regulation, monitoring costs and 
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insights shed by collective action and transaction c st theories, application of both theories 
remains limited. This study draws on both theories to analyse the role played by EFO in 
addressing production and marketing constraints perceived by members and non-members. 
Failure to perceive changes in perceived costs and benefits has collapsed attempts to 
promote collective action, particularly in poor communities where the costs and benefits 
tend to be significant (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). 
 
4.7 Chapter summary 
Renewed interest in developmental problems associated with smallholders has focused 
attention on opportunities presented by organic agriculture. A shift to organic agriculture 
encompasses institutional, ecological, economic, and gronomic dimensions and more 
importantly requires that farmers engage in collectiv  action through formation of 
smallholder organic groups. Collective action requires involvement of a group of people in 
some common action directed towards achieving a shared interest. Many of the lessons 
around collective action can be extracted from studies investigating the management of 
common pool resources.  
 
Collective action remains a difficult issue to measure and analyse empirically. There are no 
standardised measures or indicators for measuring the existence, viability and effectiveness 
of collective action. There is broad consensus that the success of collective action depends 
on the nature of the collective action problem, group attributes, institutional arrangements 
in place and external influences. The number of organic farming groups has been 
increasing and IFOAM has played a central role in coming up with criteria to guide group 
certification. Once a group is formed members encouter additional transaction costs in an 






of collective action include time spent at meetings, negotiating and complying with rules, 
and providing information to the organisation. If collective action does not yield sufficient 







CHAPTER 5  
 FREE-RIDING THEORY 
This Chapter provides an over view of free-rider problems associated with collective action 
in organic groups. As explained in Chapter 4, colletiv  action, apart from introducing 
additional costs, is susceptible to institutional problems such as free-riding, a common 
phenomenon in the production and distribution of colle tive goods, which can contribute to 
the demise of collective action effort. Free-riding s an institutional problem that is difficult 
to measure and understand and its impact on collecti n action remains largely unknown. 
Equally important is the need to identify appropriate institutional measures to counter it. 
This Chapter outlines the theory underpinning free-riding behaviour in groups and 
highlights progress made in analysing it empirically. The major determinants of internal 
group free-riding are then explored in greater detail before putting forward 
recommendations to mitigate it. 
 
5.1 Problems associated with collective action in organic groups 
The issue of smallholders’ exclusion from supply chains due to high transaction costs was 
also noted by Simmons (2002). In many cases, vertical coordination must be preceded by 
horizontal coordination between smallholders so that agents who sell farm inputs or who 
buy farm products are not faced with a multitude of small transactions. Poulton and Lyne 
(forthcoming) argue that horizontal coordination can range from informal agreements 
between farmers to coordinate purchases and sales, to groups that are formally constituted 
to facilitate collective action (like farmers’ associations and organisations), and ultimately 






firms). The latter represent horizontal integration as opposed to horizontal coordination 
where collective action still involves some degree of shared decision-making. 
 
While horizontal coordination and integration can reduce transaction costs and improve 
smallholder access to more reliable markets, group arrangements can introduce costs and 
institutional problems that discourage smallholder pa ticipation and investment such as 
free-riding. Gadzikwa et al. (2006a) examines costs and other determinants of continued 
participation in EFO and identify free-riding as a potential threat to the group’s 
performance. Ostrom (1992b) and Gripsrud et al. (2000) view free-riding as one of three 
types of opportunistic behaviour, in addition to rent-seeking and corruption, found in many 
smallholder group institutions. Cook and Illiopolus (1999; 2002) and Sykuta and Cook 
(2001) highlight the adverse effects of free-riding on the performance of traditional 
marketing cooperatives and attribute the problem to ill-defined property rights within these 
organisations.  
 
EFO’s constitution entrenches several principles that underpin traditional cooperatives, 
such as net margins distributed according to patronge, democratic control (one member 
one vote) and open membership. Membership comprises of fully organic certified farmers 
who founded the organisation, and partially certified members who joined later and who 
are transitioning to fully certified status. Unlike a cooperative, EFO has no equity 
ownership scheme and, therefore, does not offer share  in return for capital invested by its 
members. The arguments presented by Cook and Illiopo us (2002) seem to suggest that 
EFO is likely to suffer from collective action, free-rider and contractual problems linked to 
marketing of its produce because the gains from cooperative action can be accessed by 






5.2 Free-riding theory and organic farming groups 
The free-rider problem is highly pervasive and often occurs in situations where collective 
action is required (Esteban & Ray, 2001). Free-riders avoid the full cost of benefits they 
receive from collective action. Perceptions of free- iding therefore tend to undermine 
group formation and the productivity of individual group members (Kidwell & Bennett, 
1993). Free-riding can be distinguished as external free-riding and internal free-riding. 
External free-riding occurs when non-members of an organisation cannot be excluded from 
accessing group membership benefits. Internal free-riding occurs when members abscond 
from fulfilling membership obligations, but at the same time access full membership 
benefits. The theory of free-riding is therefore relevant to problems of the commons 
(Edney, 1980), social traps (Platt, 1973) and social dilemmas (Orbell & Dawes, 1981) and 
his implications for smallholder organic group formations. 
 
Economists usually assume that individuals are inherently selfish and are therefore likely 
to adopt free-riding as a dominant strategy in the provision of public goods (Ledyard, 
1995). Unlike private goods, public goods are characterised by non-excludability and low 
rivalry. Between the two extremes of public and private goods are toll goods (low rivalry, 
high excludability) and common pool resources (low excludability and high rivalry). 
Groups of organic certified smallholders are often more concerned with these intermediate 
goods than with the provision of public goods. Some of the services managed by EFO 
constitute intermediate goods (e.g. storage and transport) while others resemble public 
goods (e.g. product inspection and market access). Free-rider problems are relevant in both 







The majority of empirical studies of free-riding behaviour have been predominantly 
experimental in nature, intent on identifying the incidence of free-riding while controlling 
for social and cultural factors (Andreoni, 1995; Chong, 2001). Some empirical studies have 
analysed the impact of group size on free-riding in real world contexts, sometimes ignoring 
other important variables such as group heterogeneity (Naidu, 2005).   Chong (2001) noted 
that the incentive to free-ride is influenced by socio-economic variables and is strongly 
linked to the nature of the public good.  
 
Organising collective action incurs costs. Rational i dividuals, acting selfishly, would be 
unwilling to bear these costs personally if the benefits accrue to free-riders. The influence 
of group size on free-riding once a group has been formed is a function of noticeability, 
perceptibility and individual share in the benefits of collective action (Albanese & Van 
Fleet, 1985). Small group sizes increase the noticeab lity of free-riders, and members tend 
to perceive that their contributions will make a difference, inducing contributions from 
others. In large groups, noticeability of member contributions diminishes and group 
administrators tend to have less information about each member to verify individual 
behaviour (Rokkan & Buvik, 2003). Growth in the size of the group is therefore expected 
to increase the cost of monitoring and enforcing memb rs’ contributions, while 
simultaneously diluting their individual benefits.  
 
In short, members of large collective action groups have greater opportunity to free-ride 
and less incentive not to free-ride than do members of smaller groups. Olson (1965: 48) 
contends that the dominant strategy in large groups will be to free-ride in the absence of 
coercion or selective (e.g. proportional) benefits, but argues that some members may be 






benefits. Although EFO’s constitution does not provide for proportional benefits, it is 
possible that a skewed distribution of incentives may alleviate some of the adverse effects 
that a rapidly growing membership is expected to have on its performance. Larger farmers 
may tolerate some free-riding by smaller farmers as they stand to benefit more from the 
niche market.  
 
5.3 Empirical free-riding evidence 
Most empirical studies of free-riding behaviour have focused on Olson’s (1965:34) 
proposition that an increase in group size encourages free-riding (Sweeney, 1974; Marwell 
& Ames, 1979; Tillock & Morrison, 1979; Isaac & Walker, 1988; Alfano & Marwell, 
1980; Murry & Heide, 1998; Rokkan & Buvik, 2003). The majority of these studies found 
that group size is positively associated with free-iding tendencies (Sweeney, 1974; Alfano 
& Marwell, 1980; Isaac & Walker, 1988). However, others (Marwell & Ames, 1979; 
Tillock & Morrison, 1979) did not – possibly because group size effects may be offset by 
common goals, a skewed distribution of potential benefits and coercion or institutional 
arrangements that provide for proportional incentives. For example, the group may 
organise along the lines of an investor-owned firm (IOF) where shareholders earn 
dividends and capital gains in direct proportion to their equity contributions (shares).  
 
Free-riding theory also deals with coercion and incentives, particularly in large groups, to 
assure provision of shared goods. Coercion may include policies and procedures, controls, 
management directives and threats of expulsion. Special incentives could include shares, 
personal recognition and bonuses that improve proporti nality between individual costs 
and benefits. A group member’s decision to free-rid, according to Stroebe and Frey 






benefit of free-riding, which depends upon the probability of detection and penalties 
attached to free-riding (Fjeldstad, 2004). Free-riding would be less likely with increased 
chances of detection and severe penalties. EFO does not enforce a penalty system. For the 
purpose of this study, individual net benefits are pproximated as the difference between 
average rankings assigned by members to the benefits and costs of participating in EFO. 
These rankings reflect member perceptions and therefor  indicate the relative importance 
of individual net benefits. For example, a member with high off-farm income might claim 
lower benefits and higher costs of participating in EFO than would a member who depends 
heavily on farm income - even if they derive the same absolute net benefit. To some extent, 
this captures both interest and wealth heterogeneity w hin the group – factors that 
influenced cooperation between members of forestry user groups studied by Naidu (2005) 
in India. 
 
Trust is the level of mutual confidence that group members are dependable and competent 
(McAllister, 1995), act with integrity (Robinson, 1996), and will care for other members’ 
interests (Mischel, 1973) and not put each other at risk (Jarvenpaa et l., 2004). Higher 
levels of trust reduce transaction costs (such as the costs of negotiating rules, and 
monitoring and enforcing compliance) and therefore str ngthen incentives to cooperate. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) contend that individual and socio-economic characteristics 
(such as education, income, and past experiences) influence how much people trust each 
other. Dirks (1999) argues that less free-riding is expected where group members trust each 
other and any external parties central to the survival of the group because it reduces 







Clark and Sefton (2001) argue that trust reinforces reciprocity attitudes that reduce free-
riding. It therefore follows that higher degrees of trust are associated with greater 
cooperation (Putman, 1993). This makes trust an important determinant of free-riding 
behaviour. While acknowledging the importance of trust within a group, this study 
measures trust in terms of members’ perceptions of the integrity of the pack house that 
buys EFO’s organic produce. Following Dirk’s (1999) argument, trust in an external party 
reduces transaction costs and therefore discourages fre -riding by raising the individual 
benefits of collective action. 
 
Boyd (1996) emphasises the role played by information. Free-riding behaviour is closely 
linked to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that arise in contracts where 
asymmetries of information are present. Nabli and Nugent (1989:1337) argue that 
information asymmetry invites opportunistic behaviour, raising transaction costs and 
encouraging free-riding. For example, grading procedur s agreed upon by EFO and the 
pack house are flawed because produce cannot be traced to its point of origin (produce is 
pooled before it is graded by the pack house). The pack house cited costs and time 
constraints as the major reasons for not inspecting and grading individual produce before 
bulking. Members who are aware of this flaw might deliberately channel inferior produce 
through the pack house and so free-ride on (less well-informed) members who supply high 
quality produce. 
 
The influence of household and context variables on h usehold economic outcomes has 
been widely explored in the literature (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2000). These variables may 
indirectly measure constructs such as trust, transaction costs and a member’s ability to 






significant determinants of free-riding tendencies nclude age, gender, family size, and 
education (Putman, 1993; Wagner III, 1995; Cadsby & Maynes, 1998; Chong, 2001). 
Wagner III (1995) found race and age to be significant determinants of cooperation in his 
study of cooperation among students at Michigan State University. Chong (2001) found 
age, education of household head, and length of associ tion to be negatively associated 
with free-riding amongst households in the provision of water services in Nicaragua and 
Guatemala.  
 
Putman (1993) argued that people who have interacted ov r long periods develop increased 
cooperation, which may result in reduced free-riding. Although fully certified members of 
EFO had cooperated for more than four years, reservations about new entrants (partially 
certified members) free-riding on the effort and capital that they had invested in 
establishing the organisation and its services could easily offset any gains from cooperating 
over a long period. Orbell and Dawes (1981) evaluated the effect of free-riding perceptions 
on group performance in an experimental study and found that members averse to carrying 
free-riders eventually reduced their effort, a phenomenon known as the ‘sucker effect’ 
(Kerr, 1983). The preceding discussion demonstrates the important link between collection 
action and free-ridding, not to mention the need for a better understanding in an attempt to 
build resilient organic groups. 
 
5.4 Chapter summary 
Coordinated purchases and sales reduce the transaction costs for the buyer and groups that 
are formally constituted to facilitate collective action such as farmer associations and 
cooperatives introduce additional costs and are plagued by institutional problems that 






enjoy benefits without paying fully for their creation, can have adverse effects on the 
performance of smallholder organic groups and is found in organisations with ill-defined 
property rights. Many studies have identified a number of factors that may contribute to 
free-riding tendencies. These include information asymmetry in contractual arrangements, 
lower degrees of trust, low net benefits of participating, context and household variables, 
and increasing group size. Existence of free-riding i  group settings may create 
sustainability problems and eventually lead to the demise of collective efforts due to the 






CHAPTER 6  
 CONTRACT THEORY 
From a NIE perspective, contracts are viewed as governance mechanisms designed to 
minimise transaction costs. Contract farming is viewed as one form of governance in the 
vertical coordination continuum, lying somewhere between the spot market and full 
vertical integration. There are opposing arguments concerning the effectiveness of 
contracts in linking farmers to high value organic markets. The success of contracts 
depends to a large extent on the context and appropriateness of contractual arrangements 
adopted. Farmers collectively working together have a greater chance of clinching 
contractual deals.  
 
However, improper contractual arrangements may accentuate existing free-riding 
tendencies or even encourage them where they do not exist. Contract design and structure 
is therefore important in understanding the functioning of organic groups. This Chapter 
conceptualises arguments around vertical coordinatio  in supply chain relationships by 
exploring theoretical and empirical issues around contracts and contractual arrangements in 
smallholder organic farming systems. It compares theoretical insights shed by the 
transaction costs and incomplete contract analytica frameworks, reviews empirical studies 
dwelling on contract design and structure, and demonstrates their relevance to the study of 
organic farming groups. 
 
6.1 Contractual arrangements in supply chain relationships 
Food and agricultural markets tend to be characterised by different forms of coordination 






time, increased consumer demands for food safety in fresh produce markets have led to 
concerns about the ability of small farmers and small agribusinesses in developing 
countries to comply with stringent food safety requirements (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). 
Interestingly, opportunities for these smallholders lie in product differentiation, organic 
products, and exploitation of other high value niche markets. Contract farming and its 
variants (e.g. grower schemes, nucleus or core estate models, satellite farming) are 
considered a means to integrate small farmers into high value niche markets through 
provision of technology, ready markets for inputs and products, and stable prices 
(Weatherspoon et al., 2001) despite criticism that it is another form of exploitation 
(Glover, 1987). The emergence of contract farming among smallholders has been 
motivated by the need to address market failures associated with spot markets including 
poor or imperfect credit and insurance markets, lack of market information, lack of access 
to production inputs and poorly developed product markets (Key & Rusten, 1999). 
 
Williamson and Scott (1999) identified three classes of contracts that have relevance in 
determining coordination performance. These are classic l, neoclassical and relational 
contracts.  NIE provides a theoretical framework that elps to explain the existence of 
contract farming, as many problems associated with imperfect and missing markets are 
caused by asymmetric information and other factors hat raise transaction costs (Minot, 
1999; Grosh, 1994; Key & Rusten, 1999).  
 
6.2 Theories of contractual relationships 
6.2.1 Definition and role of contracts 
Bogetoft and Olesen (2002) identify the role of contracts as coordinating a business 






parties, and minimising transactions costs. Every transaction has three basic elements: the 
allocation of value, the allocation of risk and theallocation of decision rights. A contract is 
viewed as an institutional construct outlining the mutually agreed rules of how these 
fundamental elements will be addressed. From a legal standpoint, a contract is a legally 
enforceable promise. Any contract, whether written or verbal, should specify the 
responsibilities and obligations of the contracting parties, enforcement procedures and 
remedial measures in case of a breach. However, from an economic perspective, contracts 
are viewed as governance mechanisms, outlining expected and agreed upon allocations of 
value, risk and decision rights associated with transactions, and are necessarily incomplete 
(Sykuta & Parcel, 2002). Contractual arrangements commonly observed in organic farming 
groups regulate transactions between the certified group and outside buyers such as pack 
houses and retailers. This is to synchronise production and processing of highly perishable 
organic produce. 
 
Contracts between producers and buyers differ in their objectives (Eaton & Shepherd, 
2001) and structure depending on the nature of organisations, levels of risk involved, 
bargaining power and production patterns (Sporleder, 1992). The contract could specify 
the price (fixed or differential), quantity, provision of inputs and credit, production 
conditions, delivery mechanisms, and grading requirments (Rusten & Key, 1996). 
Different types of contracts, ranging from marketing contracts to contracts specifying some 
measure of buyer control over production, represent different levels of market coordination 
(Wolz & Kirsch, 1999). 
 
Numerous studies have explored and documented the exp ri nce of successful contract 






(1996), Karaan (1999), van Rooyen (1999), and Sartorius et al. (2003), amongst others, 
have documented some South African contracting experiences. These studies, though not 
exhaustive, have noted numerous advantages accruing to small contract farmers, such as 
skills transfer, guaranteed prices and improved access to inputs, services, credit, 
technology and reliable markets (Glover & Kusterer, 1990; Eaton & Sheperd, 2001). The 
disadvantages farmers may encounter include increased ri k, inappropriate technology, 
manipulation of quotas and quality, corruption, domination by monopolies, indebtedness 
and over-reliance on loan advances (Runsten, 1992; Tiffen, 1995; Runsten & Key, 1996). 
Where contracts exist, they encounter problems of contract enforcement, high unit 
transaction costs, high demands for consistency, attitudes and ethics encouraging non-
compliance, high rates of product rejection by interm diaries, and weak bargaining power 
of farmers. For example, EFO frequently contest high rates of product rejection reported 
by the buyer (Gadzikwa et al., 2006b). Such problems may lead to the exclusion of 
smallholders from contractual relationships (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002) or to the collapse 
of contract farming. Local organic farming groups such as Vukuzakhe and Makhuluseni, 
both in KwaZulu-Natal, failed in their embryonic stages.  
 
Some studies of vertical coordination in agriculture have investigated the impact of 
contracts on industry structure, particularly the hog and poultry industries (Lawrence, t 
al., 1997; Harl, 1990, 2000). Goodhue (2000) contends that understanding of contractual 
issues outside the poultry industry is generally limited, while Sykuta and Parcel (2002) 
generalise this claim to contract structure itself. South Africa has produced very little 
research on contract design, or on contract farming outside the sugarcane and timber 
industries. Organic farming has been gathering momentum in southern Africa over the last 






premiums are rare. The South African market is supported by supplies from 45000 hectares 
of organically certified land made up of 250 commercial farms (Yussefi, 2006). Proponents 
of contract farming assert that smallholders who cannot finance fertilisers and chemicals, 
and who are organic farmers by default, encounter minimum conversion costs to high 
value organic farming (Parrott et al., 2006).  
 
6.3 Contract analytical frameworks 
Contractual relationships are analysed differently by Incomplete Contract Theory (ICT) 
and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), even though bot theories emphasise contract 
incompleteness. Several propositions to explain the existence of incomplete contracts were 
explored by Maskin and Tirole (1999). These include lexical limitations that make 
contracts unclear; bounded rationality that causes economic agents to overlook relevant 
variables for contract realisation; trade-off between the gain of a new provision and its cost 
when negotiating a contract; the inability of contrac ing parties to assign probabilities to 
many contingencies; and finally, the existence of information asymmetries between 
contracting parties (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Shavel, 1998). However, Saussier (2000a) 
noted that contract incompleteness is not a problem p r se, as it does not always involve 
economic inefficiency, but becomes one as soon as qu i-rent (value conditional on the 
continuation of a relationship) is created. Contracting parties, therefore, have no assurance 
that the quasi-rent they create will not be appropriated through opportunistic behaviour 
when contracts are incomplete.  
 
ICT disregards the concept of bounded rationality in its analysis of contractual 
relationships. Economic agents are assumed able to foresee all contingencies that affect 






of relevant variables, thereby making information asymmetries the source of 
incompleteness (Hart, 1995). ICT formalises the hold-up problem emphasised in TCE by 
suggesting that the party who owns specific assets has the right to decide ex-post situations 
left out of a contract. This induces x-ante investment level inefficiencies as the party that 
controls residual claims may appropriate all positive surpluses (Hart & Moore, 1999). The 
crucial problem explored by this ICT’s analytical framework is the choice of the 
property/contract structure that would minimise ex-ante investment inefficiency (Saussier, 
2000b).  
 
By contrast, TCE theory proposes that contract incompleteness is a result of bounded 
rationality. Given that a party to a contract may rely on incompleteness to act 
opportunistically, contractual relationships are threfore an embodiment of cost minimising 
considerations; i.e. the trade-off between the need to be insured by a contract, especially in 
case of specific investments, and willingness to adapt the transaction to unplanned 
circumstances (Williamson, 2000). The contract is viewed not only as an incentive tool to 
minimise ex-ante investment inefficiencies, but also to facilitate ex-post adaptation in order 
to avoid quasi-rent dissipation through inefficient ex-post bargaining (Saussier, 2000b). 
Specific investments are made by members of organic f rming groups in that they adopt 
unique technology to capture the organic value of produce and are unable to secure 
comparable value in alternative markets. Intermediaries such as the pack house that buys 
from EFO also have to invest in specific technology and brands that have little value 
outside organics.  
 
Since it is not feasible to construct a watertight contract that specifies all responsibilities 






one contractual party may exploit to the detriment of the other. These loopholes are often 
present as ambiguities in language or new situations not covered in the contract. Costly or 
imperfect monitoring and enforcement of contract terms creates an incentive to shirk on 
contractual obligations. An efficient contract minimises ex-ante costs of contract design 
and negotiation as well as ex-post costs of opportunism (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). 
 
The preceding discussion emphasises that, despite theoretical expositions of perfect 
contract models, in reality contract design and structure is fraught with problems as argued 
by Fraser (2005). These include forcing disadvantages on the other party (hold-up) in the 
formative stages of the contract; one party being better informed about non-verifiable 
characteristics of the product being exchanged (adverse selection); and one party having 
imperfect information concerning actions of the other during contract implementation 
(moral hazard). This implies that contract design and implementation must generate 
incentives that outweigh these problems. The level and nature of incentives embodied in a 
contract mirrors the risk that each party is prepard to endure. A typical contract between a 
group of organic farmers and their buyer should therefore cover the following aspects as 
postulated by Eaton and Sheperd (2001). 
 
6.3.1 Legal framework 
Legal framework refers to the law of contract in a particular country, as well as the manner 
in which the law is generally used and practised. A contract should be cognisant of 
prevailing societal attitudes towards contracts and their validity in the presence of political, 
climatic or personnel changes. Common practices should dictate how detailed contracts 
ought to be; bearing in mind that a buyer is unlikely to take legal action against 






However, the need for a contract remains critically important as it spells out clearly the 
expected relationship between parties. 
 
6.3.2 Contract formula  
The formula refers to the circumstances under which a contract operates. Contracts are 
usually designed for a specific context defined by prevailing market, resource, 
management and property right arrangements. In general, the contract formula identifies 
managerial responsibilities, pricing structures ande vironmental and technical conditions 
that constrain production and marketing.  
 
6.3.3 Contract format 
The format refers to the manner in which a contract is presented. For example, contracts 
may be formal agreements, simple registrations or verbal agreements. Formal agreements 
are detailed, legally endorsed contracts that specify obligations in explicit form. They are 
suitable for large and long-term investments and in cases where land tenure is insecure. 
Simple registration often characterises centralised mo els where members of a group are 
required to complete a registration form that binds them to a collective contract (Watts, 
1994). Contracts based on verbal agreements are informal and permit conflicting 
interpretations of responsibilities and specifications in the absence of clear explanations 
from management to farmers (Eaton & Sheperd, 2001; Fraser, 2005). Verbal contracts are 
common in marketing agreements between growers and processors of fresh produce and 







6.3.4 Contract specification 
Specifications govern the implementation of a contract. Most contracts specify some or all 
of the following aspects of an agreement: contract duration, quality standards, production 
quotas, cultivation practices, delivery arrangements, prices, payment procedures and 
insurance requirements. Specifications are influenced by the nature of the product, supply 
reliability, asset specificity, cash flows and quality incentives (Eaton & Sheperd, 2001; 
Hueth et al., 1999). 
 
6.4 Empirical analysis of contracts in agriculture 
6.4.1 Contract farming in practice 
In practice, different farming systems and institutional arrangements give rise to different 
contract farming models. The models can be categorised as centralised, nucleus estate, 
multipartite, informal, and intermediary. The approriate model depends on the product, 
objectives and resources of the sponsor or buyer, and experience of the farmers (Eaton & 
Sheperd, 2001).  
 
The informal contract model is relevant to the study of EFO. Informal contracts are best 
suited to farmers who negotiate simple seasonal contracts to sell crops such as fresh 
vegetables that require minimum processing (Vermeulen et al., 2006). The buyer or 
sponsor’s involvement is normally limited to the provision of key inputs and advice on 
grading and quality control. The buyer, after purchasing the crop, grades and packages it 
for resale. Examples of informal models include the government supported production of 
gherkins in Sri Lanka (Dunham, 1995), production of export bananas, squash and papaya 






all under verbal contracts (Eaton & Sheperd, 2001). The success of such informal 
contractual arrangements hinges on the availability of support services. This is particularly 
critical in Africa where input supply chains weakened following market liberalisation 
(Shepherd & Farolfi, 1999). 
 
The role of contracts in promoting better industry coordination, improving efficiency and 
reducing risks associated with agriculture cannot be over-emphasised (Koehler, 1999). 
Experience gained in the hog industry suggests that the performance of contract farming in 
the organic industry depends heavily on the length of contracts, right of first refusal on 
surplus production, financial monitoring and discloure requirements, and methods of 
determining prices (Koehler, 1999). Dulce et al. (2006) also raised concerns about low 
levels of trust and commitment hampering hybrid forms of smallholder coordination where 
verbal agreements are in place. As a result, contractual performance is undermined by 
tensions, quality and quantity problems, and weak incentives to comply. 
 
6.4.2 Previous studies of contractual arrangements 
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) showed that most empirical applications of contract theory 
in agriculture regressed contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics. 
From a TCE perspective, the main objective of studies by Allen (1985), Eswaran and 
Kotwal (1985), Hayami and Otsuka (1993), Luporini ad Parigi (1996) and Lanjouw 
(1999) was to identify important determinants of eficient contractual arrangements. 
Applications of risk-sharing and transaction cost models in agriculture offer little evidence 
that risk sharing is an important determinant of contract choice, which Ackerberg and 






capital constraints, and multitasking have been ident fi d as important determinants of 
contractual arrangements (Allen & Lueck, 1992; Laffont & Matoussi, 1995). 
 
Allen and Lueck (1992) examined the use of written versus oral leases for farmland. 
Formal, written contracts prevailed for land requiring investment in, and maintenance of, 
irrigation systems. Informal, oral contracts were common where family ties were strong 
and where there was a history of ongoing relations. Transaction cost studies of contract 
duration have been conducted largely outside agriculture. Typical examples include 
Joskow’s (1987) study of 300 contracts between coal mines and coal-fired electricity 
generators, Crocker and Masten’s (1988) study of 245 natural gas contracts (which 
examined the impact of costs and benefits of contracting on the duration of contractual 
agreements) and Saussier’s (1999) study of coal transportation contracts in France. 
 
Contract theory provides no unified structure for specifying and testing design hypotheses 
(Masten & Saussier, 2000) and contract design varies w dely in practice. Major challenges 
in analysing contract provisions emanate from their discrete and continuous forms. Prices 
(Joskow, 1988), royalty rates and franchise fees (Bercovitz, 1999), and take-or-pay 
provisions (Masten & Crocker, 1985) tend to be continuous variables, whereas price 
adjustment methods are usually discrete (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993).  
 
Provisions that have dominated empirical studies of contract design include incentives, 
prices, and price adjustment methods. Transaction cost studies of incentive provisions have 
asked whether contracts align the interests of contracting parties and promote efficient 
adjustment in the face of uncertainty. Mulherin (1986) in his study of ‘take gas’ contracts, 






fixed and variable pricing structures as ways of mini sing transaction costs rather than as 
ways of dealing with moral hazard and risk sharing (Leffler & Rucker, 1991; Allen & 
Lueck, 1999). Leffler and Rucker (1991) found that fixed payment contracts in forestry 
harvesting induced buyers to engage in presale quality and quantity verification, whereas 
per unit pricing led to inefficiencies in harvesting and were prevalent in heterogeneous 
timber tracks where search costs were higher.  
 
Studies of pricing provisions in contracts for farmland (Allen & Lueck, 1999) and price-
adjustment provisions in gas contracts (Crocker & Masten, 1991), procurement of jet 
engines (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993) and coal transportati n contracts (Saussier, 2000a), 
support the notion that contract design is a trade-off between low specification costs and 
rigidities that undermine performance in the presence of uncertain outcomes on the one 
hand, and greater flexibility but higher expected cost of establishing terms of trade ex post 
on the other (Saussier, 2000b). 
 
6.5 Chapter summary 
Despite evidence of mixed contract success stories, contract farming does link 
smallholders to high value niche markets. Its emergence is attributed to attempts at 
addressing the problems associated with missing markets, market failure, information 
asymmetry and high transaction costs. Contracts generally differ in their objectives and 
range from marketing contracts to contracts specifying some measure of buyer control over 
production. Cases of successful contracting are well documented and benefits accruing to 
farmers well enunciated. However, problems associated with non-compliance, high 






encountered. These problems have the potential to exclude smallholders from contractual 
relationships.  
 
Contracts can be analysed by ICT and TCE analytical frameworks. ICT explores choice of 
contract structure that that minimises x ante investment inefficiencies, while TCE views 
contractual relationships as an embodiment of transaction cost minimising considerations 
by looking at ex post adaptation to counter ex post bargaining inefficiencies. It is not 
feasible to write watertight contracts, as a result, contracts are fraught with hold-up, 
adverse selection, and moral hazard problems. While us ful in shading insights into 
contractual arrangements, contract theory does not provide a unified approach for testing 
contract design hypotheses. It is therefore important o assess the impact of perceived 
contractual terms on contract performance and in addition to identifying the determinants 






CHAPTER 7  
 MODELS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AT EFO 
This Chapter presents information on the study site and data collection methods used. 
Theoretical and empirical models postulated to analyse collective action are explained 
followed by a description of variables used to explain collective action at EFO. Lastly, the 
Chapter presents parameter estimates of the multinomial logit regression model and 
discusses the results.  
 
7.1 Data collection methodologies 
7.1.1 Study site 
The study was conducted within the Embo Community in the former Umbumbulu 
Magisterial district of KwaZulu-Natal province. The Embo region is situated south-east of 
Durban and consist of five traditional authorities: Embo, Embo-Kwakhabazela, Embo-
NkishisiMahla, Embo-Timuni and Embo-Vumakwenza. Following current district 
municipal boundaries, the study area is at the conflue ce of four magisterial districts; Ugu, 
eThekwini, Sisonke, and Umgungundlovu. The area maybe described as rural with rugged 
topography and surrounded by commercial sugar-cane producers. The study site is 
illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
7.1.2 Target group  
EFO pools and sells green beans, baby potatoes, sweet potatoes and amadumbe (taro) 
grown individually by its members to a pack house that markets fresh organic produce to a 




























Figure 7.1: Location of study site in KwaZulu-Natal 






Development and Tourism, University of Natal, Woolwrths (Pty) Ltd and the provincial 
Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs.  The project had originally been 
established by University of Natal as a participatory research exercise aimed at promoting 
indigenous vegetable production. EFO started out with 48 members and a contract to 
supply fresh produce to Pick ’n Pay Stores Ltd. Memb rs were given training and fencing 
to protect their crops from livestock. In 2003, EFO was certified by AFRISCO and began 
selling its produce to Woolworths retail chain through a certified organic pack house 
(Assegai Organics). At the time of this study, the organisation had 151 members. EFO is 
managed by a committee that is responsible for its day to day operations. The group also 
had eight internal inspectors to monitor member compliance with organic certification 
standards.  
 
7.1.3 Survey methods 
The study employed two survey designs and data werecoll cted in two phases. First, it 
drew on a census survey of all 48 fully certified and 103 partially certified EFO members, 
and second, a stratified random sample survey of 49 non-EFO farmers. The non-EFO 
respondents represented households whose members did not join the EFO (non-adopters), 
but who reside in the same area as EFO members. Fully certified members had adopted 
organic production systems and were certified as such by AFRISCO. Partially certified 
members were those in the process of converting their production systems to organic ones 
and had applied for certification. They represented late adopters. Fully certified and 
partially certified respondents were identified from certification records held at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal and a list maintained by EFO’s executive committee. Non-






wards: Ezigani, Ezimwini, Eziphambathini, Hwayi, upper Ogagwini, Lower Ogagwini and 
Nungwane.  
 
The first phase applied both a producer and a houseld questionnaire to EFO and non-
EFO respondents during the last quarter of 2004. The first phase producer questionnaire 
administered to EFO members elicited information about production and marketing of both 
organic and non-organic crops, marketing constraints, organisational and management 
issues, organic certification, membership costs and benefits, EFO’s constitutional 
arrangements and compliance with organic certificaton procedures (Appendix A). The 
producer questionnaire answered by non-EFO respondents asked similar questions but 
focused on non-organic crops and farmer’s reasons fr not joining the organic farming 
group (Appendix B). The first phase household questionnaire gathered information on 
household demographic factors, asset profiles, food security, and food consumption 
patterns (Appendix C).  
 
The second phase of data collection was conducted in the first quarter of 2005. Follow-up 
producer and household questionnaires were administered. The second phase EFO 
members’ producer questionnaire elicited information on the organic marketing contrac , 
production risks, and market information (Appendix D). Specifically, information was 
gathered on perceptions of clauses in EFO’s contract with the pack house such as contract 
format, denomination (weight or acreage), delivery options, buyer’s call and grading 
procedures. In addition, questions were asked about preferred contractual terms. The actual 
terms of EFO’s contract were established in interviews with key respondents on the 






The second phase household questionnaire focused on food security and consumption 
patterns (Appendix E). As this investigation was part of a broader research project 
covering a wide spectrum of issues, only those datarelevant to the study of institutional 
arrangements, free-riding, and contracts were used in testing the study hypothesis. 
Unfortunately, the buyer refused to participate. The data and its interpretation reflect only 
what the farmers and other stakeholders revealed and do not in anyway express the views 
and opinions of the buyer. The following sections present theoretical, empirical, and a 
discussion of multinomial logit regression results on collective action at EFO. 
 
7.2 Theoretical and empirical collective action models 
7.2.1 Multinomial logit model of collective action at EFO 
Multinomial regression models are often used to assess the effectiveness of a range of 
predictor variables in explaining a set of mutually exclusive outcomes. This study used a 
multinomial logit model to identify predictor variables that explain participation in EFO in 
collectively marketing organic products. The model istinguishes between participating 
and non-participating farmers while simultaneously explaining more subtle differences 
between fully certified and partially certified members. Explanatory variables included in 
the model extend beyond farm and farmer characteristics to include perceptions of 
problems reflecting production and transaction costs, and a variable representing the net 
benefits of participating in EFO’s collective marketing action.  
 
The dependent variable (membership status) was a nominal measure taking on (three) 
arbitrary and unordered values. Such a general unordered multinomial discrete choice 






Suppose the ith  farmer’s utility derived from EFO membership type (fully certified, 
partially certified or non-member) can be represented by  
)1(.* ijjiij XY εβ +=  
where, Yij
*  represent the expected utility that the ith farmer obtains from choosing the 
j th state of membership, Xi  is a vector of explanatory variables, β j  is a vector of their 
weights, and ε ij  represents the residuals of the utility function. The utility level the farmer 
obtains from selecting a state of membership is not observable but the membership choices 
made are. If farmers are rational in their decision, they should select the state of 
membership from a possible choice set that maximises th ir utility subject to resource 
constraints. Therefore the probability that alternative j  is chosen by the ith  individual if 
jkYY ikij ≠∀>
**
and ε ij  are independently and identically distributed, each with 
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respectively is given by: 
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This logistic function is characterised by independce of irrelevant alternatives (Dupraz, 
et al., 2002). The differences in error terms ( εε ikij − ) follow a logistic function in a 
multinomial logistic model where xi  is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables and 
jβ  are the estimated parameters that weight the exogenous variables to estimate the utility 
of alternativej . A problem with this model is that the parameter vctors Jjj ,....1, =β  are 
not identified. The identification problem according to Greene (1997) is mitigated by 
restricting the first parameter vector to zero (i.e. 01 =β ) in which case the remaining 
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which is similar to the binary choice case when2=j . The log-likelihood model estimated 

























and the marginal effects of the explanatory variables ijx  are derived from equation (1) and 



























Alternatively the log-odds are less complicated in fu ctional form than partial derivatives. 

































7.2.2 Empirical multinomial logit model of collective action at EFO 
The empirical model to estimate a respondent’s level of participation in EFO was 
postulated as:  
10NBPTCFFCMEMB ε+ϕ+δ+β+α=  
where MEMB  is the dependent variable, scoring a value of 2 for fully certified members, 
1 for partially certified members and 0 for non-members.  
FFC  = vector of farmer and farm characteristics, 
PTC  = vector of production and transaction cost indicators, 






The parameters to estimate are α, β, δ, and φ and ε  is the error term, assumed to be 
identically independently (normally) distributed with mean of zero and a variance of σ2.
This empirical model related only to the EFO and therefore excluded variables such as 
group size and heterogeneity, the quality of institutional arrangements and external 
influences thought to explain different levels of participation between groups.  
 
7.2.3 Rationalising the empirical model of collective action 
Variables representing farmer characteristics included age, literacy, and gender of the 
respondent (EFO member, or household head in case of non-members). Certain farmer 
characteristics are proxies for transactions costs encountered in markets and in collective 
action. For example, younger farmers may face higher transaction costs in alternative 
markets than older farmers who tend to have stronger social networks. Education can also 
reduce transaction costs in alternative markets by improving an individual’s capacity to 
assemble and interpret information. In this study, education was approximated by literacy, 
a dummy variable scoring 1(0) for respondents who could (could not) read and understand 
English, the lingua franca of commerce and business in KwaZulu-Natal (Matungul, 2001). 
Eckel and Grossman (1998) contend that women are mo cooperative than are men. At 
the same time, rural women in developing countries ar  thought to face higher transaction 
costs in markets owing to their lower social standing (Berry, 1993). These views suggest 
that a dummy variable scoring 1(0) for females (males) should impact positively on 
participation in EFO. Age and literacy, on the other and, are unlikely to determine group 
membership if they reduce (more or less equally) transaction costs associated with both 







Farm characteristics were represented by farm area, family labour and the ratio of farm 
income to total household income. The latter variable grows with increasing dependency 
on farm income, raising the opportunity cost of notparticipating in EFO (Molinas, 1998). 
The ratio was expressed in log terms to eliminate outliers and was expected to bear 
positively on participation in EFO. Larger farms are expected to improve a household’s 
ability to produce surplus crops for the market after actoring in rotational and subsistence 
constraints (Promar International, 1999) and therefore, increase potential earnings from 
organic production. On the other hand, larger farms also make it feasible for farmers to 
produce extensive commercial crops such as sugar-cane rather than land intensive organic 
crops.  
 
Certification of organic crops becomes more complex and costly when they are produced 
in close proximity to non-organic crops on small areas of land. Certification prohibits the 
use of pesticides and herbicides, increasing the demand for family and hired labour. It 
follows that households with more family labour are more likely to participate in EFO. 
Unlike Molinas (1998) who used family size to approximate family labour, this study 
excluded migrant workers and children younger than school-going age from the family’s 
stock of on-farm labour, and weighed resident adults over the age of 65 and children under 
the age of 16 as half adult equivalents. This is to compensate for the loss of productivity 
from young persons who spend the greater part of their ime in school. Adults over 65 
years of age are assumed to have reached retirement ag  and are considered less productive 
in physical work than those still of working age. 
 
Production and transaction costs were measured in terms of constraints perceived by 






problem) to 3 (severe problem). Production constrain s, including risk, were indicated by 
the following constraints: crop damage caused by livestock; uncertain prices for crops; 
more work than the family can handle; lack of cash nd credit to finance inputs; a lack of 
affordable operating inputs; and tractors not availble when needed. Households 
perceiving these production constraints as severe problems were expected to participate in 
EFO to counter them.  
 
These constraints are relevant to EFO because the farmers are located in an area with no 
planned grazing and farming zones. Livestock grazes on fallow land in between cultivated 
lands, thereby increasing the risk of crop damage by livestock. Price volatility in the local 
produce markets could be a major concern because pric s are neither fixed nor stable 
thereby increasing farmers’ exposure to price risk. The demand for labour is assumed to 
differ across different farming systems. Naturally, organic farming prohibits the use of 
synthetic chemicals to control weeds and pests forcing farmers to rely on labour to do most 
of the tasks. An organic farming system is expected to impose a considerable demand on 
family labour resources when compared to a conventional production system.  
 
Smallholders are generally under resourced, lacking cash and with limited access to credit. 
Access to credit is further complicated by lack of formal production and marketing records 
and absence of collateral. As a result, lenders are reluctant to advance loans to smallholders 
due to perceived high loan default risks. Another production constraint assumed relevant to 
the study is the inability of smallholders to access affordable production inputs. Given that 
these are low-tech production system, the use of external inputs is low, but accessing 






Transaction cost constraints were measured by a lack of rop production information, lack 
of affordable transport for products, and a lack of telephones to negotiate transactions. The 
assumption is that crop production information is not easily available to the farmers and 
government extension services have capacity constrai ts to adequately serve the farmers. 
The state of rural infrastructure always poses a challenge to rural producers. Without a 
reliable transport system, farmers are likely to incur high transport costs in moving their 
produce to the market. This is compounded further by lack of communication 
infrastructure to effectively link farmers with markets. For example, a lack of affordable 
transport will amplify transaction costs if it constitutes a severe problem, and this was 
expected to encourage participation in EFO in order to dilute transport costs.  
 
Farmers incur substantial costs on their way to becoming a fully certified member of the 
EFO. Candidates accepted by EFO’s selection committee face the onerous task of 
completing a formal application for organic certification to AFRISCO. Applicants must 
submit detailed land use plans and historical production information along with their 
certification fees. Fortunately for EFO, certification fees had been fully subsidised by the 
Department of Economic Development and Tourism and applicants had been able to draw 
on research staff at the University of KwaZulu-Natal for assistance in preparing their 
documentation. Nevertheless, EFO members were obliged to pay annual membership fees 
and to participate fully in all group activities.  
 
Information about the costs of collective action was c ptured by asking respondents to rate 
the burden of membership fees, their time spent at meetings/group activities, additional 
work effort in crop production, increased expenditure on hired labour, and other operating 






averaged to compute a composite ‘cost score’ for each respondent. The total composite 
‘cost score’ for each respondent ranged from a minium of 5 to a maximum of 20. The 
expectation is that organic group members are requid to pay annual membership to meet 
the costs of running their organization and commit ore of the scarce time to the 
organisation by attending meetings, workshops, training and many other group activities. 
As explained in the preceding paragraph, organic farming is likely to incur increased 
labour and other additional input costs. 
 
EFO membership provides material benefits. These include: provision of fencing to protect 
crops from stray livestock; better access to tractor services; better access to information 
about organic crop production; access to reliable markets; better prices for crops; better 
access to inputs; subsidisation of organic certification fees; and a voice to lobby for 
support. Several benefits are subsidised by outside parties, especially the Provincial 
Departments of Agriculture, Transport, and Economic Development and Tourism. 
Information about the benefits of collective action was elicited by asking respondents to 
rate EFO’s performance in realising expected gains on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(none) to 4 (major). These scores were then averaged to compute a composite ‘benefit 
score’ for each respondent, which ranged from a minimum score of 8 to a maximum score 
of 32 from which the composite ‘cost score’ was subtracted to yield a ‘net benefit’ score. 
The expected range of ‘net benefit scores’ was a minimum of -12 for members perceiving 
low net benefits and a maximum of 27 for those perceiving high net benefits. For non-
members, the net benefit of joining EFO is assumed to be zero otherwise they would join 
EFO as did the partial adopters. Consequently, this variable returned zero (0) for non-







7.2.4 Farm and farmer characteristics 
Table 7.1 summarises descriptive statistics for explanatory variables used in the 
multinomial logit regression model. Quantitative variables were expressed as averages, 
whereas the gender and literacy dummy variables were reported as percentages.  
Table 7.1: Farm and farmer characteristics and the net benefit of collective action, 
EFO, KwaZulu-Natal, 2004/5 







 n=49 N=103 N=48 
Age (years) 52.65 48.80 52.71 
Gender Female (%) 83.67 71.84 81.25 
Read English Yes (%) 22.45 27.18 25.00 
Farm area (ha)  0.79 0.56 0.65 
Family labour (adult equivalents) 3.02 4.07 4.23 
LN(farm income/total income) -6.88 -6.03 -3.16 
Net benefit score 0.00 4.02 7.40 
 
The average age of respondents was generally high (around 50 years) but lowest for 
partially certified members (late adopters). Female representation was high in all of the 
groups but (unexpectedly) lowest (71.8%) in the partially certified group. Overall, these 
findings were consistent with previous studies in the province that estimated the average 
rural household head to be roughly 60 years of age (Matungul, 2001) and that found that 
most de facto heads were female (Marcus, et al., 1995). The proportion of respondents able 
to read and understand English was very low, ranging from 22.5% amongst non-members 
to 27.2% for partially certified members. EFO members appeared to farm more intensively 
than do non-members. On average, they had smaller frms, more family labour and earned 
a greater share of total household income from farming. Farm income included remittances 
received by the household, but excluded social transfer. As might be expected, fully 






7.2.5 Production and transaction cost indicators 
Table 7.2 presents the average scores computed for production and transaction cost 
indicators. The range of possible scores for each of the production and transaction cost 
indicators in Table 7.2 is 1 to 4. Any scores below 2 indicate minor problems, whereas any 
scores above it indicate serious to severe problems. Table 7.2 provides an indication of 
how the different farmer categories perceived similar production and transaction cost 
constraints. Non-EFO members assigned more weight to problems of crop damage caused 
by livestock, uncertain product prices and lack of technical information than did fully 
certified members. Conversely, fully certified members were more concerned about labour 
shortages than were non-members.  
 
Table 7.2: Mean scores of production and transaction cost indicators, EFO, 
KwaZulu-Natal, 2004/5 
Production and transaction cost indicators  Membership status 






 n=49 N=103 N=48 
Crop damage caused by livestock 2.80 2.76 2.51 
Uncertain prices for crops 2.17 1.93 1.96 
More work than the family can handle 2.53 2.26 2.63 
Lack of cash and credit to finance inputs 2.78 2.54 2.77 
Lack of affordable operating inputs 2.51 2.46 2.83 
Tractor not available when needed 2.46 2.70 2.92 
Lack of crop production information 2.16 2.17 1.96 
Lack of affordable transport for products 2.06 2.37 2.74 
Lack of telephones to negotiate transactions 2.22 2.63 2.54 
 
While these differences in group means were consistent with expectations it is clear that 
others were not. For example, EFO members assigned more weight to transport and tractor 
problems than did non-members. The multinomial logit regression model estimated the 






7.2.6 Marginal effects of explanatory variables 
Table 7.3 presents the marginal effects of each explanatory variable estimated by the 
multinomial logit regression model when the non-memb rship category (Y=0) and 
partially certified group (Y=1) were compared to the default full membership group (Y=2). 
Numeracy problems identified in the data set were eliminated, first by reducing the number 
of categories in the production and transaction costs constraints variables from three to two 
(converting them into dummy variables) by merging the ‘no problem’ and ‘moderate 
problem’ categories into a ‘moderate problem’ = 0 category, and second by dropping 
variables causing perfect separation of the dependent variable. Variables causing quasi and 
perfect separation of the dependent variable included the respondent’s rating of problems 
such as inadequate storage facilities, a shortage of manure to purchase, and a lack of access 
to more cropland.  
 
These variables did not contain sufficient variation within the three groups being compared 
and were excluded from the model. A comparison of the estimated multinomial logit 
model with and without independent variables as shown by the goodness-of-fit statistic (χ2 
= 138.7) is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of probability. The predictive 
power of the model is assessed by comparing predicted and actual group membership. The 
proportional, by chance, accuracy criterion for the model of 49.4% is satisfied, given the 
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The estimated model correctly classifies 83.3% of partially certified members, 71.4% of 
fully certified members, and 54.3% of non-members. Statistically significant explanatory 
variables are asterisked in Table 7.3. Significance testing is based on the likelihood ratio 
and therefore detects a significant overall relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables. Among the farm and farmer chara teristics, only the coefficients 
estimated for the opportunity cost of not participating in EFO (LN[farm income/total 
household income]) and the net benefit of collective action were statistically significant. 
Contrary to Eckel and Grossman’s (1998) suggestion that women are more cooperative 
than men, and Wynn et al’s. (2001) finding that age is a significant determinant of 
collective action, neither gender nor age was a significant determinant of the three 
membership categories considered in this study. Although the coefficients estimated for 
farm area were not statistically significant, there is some evidence (asymptotic t-value ≥ 1) 
that households with larger farms opted for less intensive conventional farming systems. 
 
Growth in the net benefits of collective action favoured fully certified membership of EFO. 
An increase in net benefits reduced the likelihood f being a non-member by more than it 
reduced the likelihood of being a partially certified member of EFO. The implication is 
that partially certified members perceived some net benefits in participation despite high 
costs and meagre returns experienced during the conversion period (Damiani, 2003). 
 
The coefficients estimated for the opportunity cost f not-participating in EFO were both 
statistically significant and indicate that the chances of participating fully in EFO increased 
as farming’s share of household income grew. However, it is important to recognise that 
the level of income may influence collective action for different reasons. Verba et al. 






of households that cannot afford the investments demanded by organisations. This study 
did not examine the impact of absolute levels of income or wealth on continued 
participation so it can be inferred only that members are more likely to remain with EFO if 
they had relatively fewer options to exit the organic farming group. 
 
With regard to production and transaction costs, only the dummy variables indicating crop 
damage caused by livestock, uncertain crop prices, lack of affordable operating inputs, lack 
of crop production information, and a lack of affordable transport for products were 
significant determinants of group membership. Members of EFO who rated livestock as a 
serious threat to their crops were more likely to be partially certified than fully certified, an 
apparent reference to the fact that fencing materials h d been donated to the early adopters 
but not to late adopters. 
 
Farmers face price uncertainty, particularly in spot markets for perishable products. This 
creates an incentive for small farmers to join groups that can bulk up and enter into 
forward contracts on behalf of their members (Delgado, 1999). Perceptions of price 
uncertainty contributed significantly to differences between partially and fully certified 
members of EFO. Fully certified members were more concerned about price volatility in 
conventional fresh produce markets than were partially certified members. This finding 
may be a symptom of poor synchronization between harvesting and the buyer’s call for 
deliveries that encouraged fully certified members to direct their relatively larger output 
into conventional markets. 
 
The coefficients estimated for ‘lack of affordable operating inputs’ both had asymptotic t-






increase when this problem is considered to be serious. While it is true that organic 
farming has reduced options for management strategies to maintain soil fertility and 
control weeds, pests, and diseases (Mackay et al., 2002), and restricts farmers to organic 
inputs (including commercial organic fertilizers tha  are relatively expensive), this finding 
suggested that EFO members of long standing have not realised any meaningful price 
discounts for operating inputs. 
 
The odds in favour of being a fully certified member decrease when ‘lack of crop 
production information’ is rated as a serious problem. This finding was anticipated because 
fully certified members benefited from information about organic farming sponsored by 
government and partners such as the University of KwaZulu-Natal over a relatively long 
period of time. Collective action improved access to information, so encouraging 
continued participation in EFO. 
 
Lack of affordable transport to ferry produce to markets was a significant determinant of 
group membership, distinguishing partially and fully certified members. Contrary to 
expectations, perceptions of serious transport problems increase the odds of being a long-
standing member of EFO. It would seem that EFO has not been able to dilute transport 
costs, despite having access to a subsidized (but unreliable) government truck. This raised 
fundamental concerns about EFO’s long-term success.  
 
Although the coefficients estimated for ‘lack of telephones’ were not statistically 
significant for either non-members or partially certified members, their asymptotic t-values 
exceed unity in both cases. The opposing signs of the coefficients suggest that perceptions 






certified EFO membership. In other words, EFO may not have invested sufficiently in 
telephones, fax machines and postal services to attract new members or to encourage 
continued participation in the organisation.  
 
7.3 Chapter summary 
Collective action observed in EFO gave smallholders access to an organic market, 
primarily by spreading the fixed costs of organic certification. The extent to which a 
farmer remains interested in collective action is a function of the perceived benefits and 
costs of doing so.  The empirical model has shown that farmer characteristics such as age 
and gender are poor indicators of continued participation in organic groups. However, 
growth in the net benefits of participation has a positive bearing on participation while 
increases in farm size and non-farm earnings (relativ  to farm earnings) reduces the 
chances of continued participation. 
 
Consistent with theory, collection action in EFO has positively contributed towards a 
reduction in some production and transaction costs, while having no meaningful impact on 
others. The results suggest that EFO has reduced fully certified members’ concerns that 
crops would be damaged by livestock or constrained by inadequate technical information. 
Transactions costs associated with price uncertainty in conventional markets, lack of 
affordable operating inputs, lack of affordable transport, and a lack of communications 







CHAPTER 8  
 EMPIRICAL FREE-RIDING MODEL AT EFO 
The threat of free-riding could potentially lead to the collapse of groups characterised by 
ill-defined property rights. While literature has attempted to explain factors promoting 
free-riding tendencies, studies attempting to measure it are generally lacking. This Chapter 
develops a measure of free-riding and proposes an empirical model for identifying its 
significant determinants. Specifically, it presents the empirical models and a description of 
variables used to measure and analyse free-riding at EFO. The threat of a free-rider 
problem at EFO is illustrated, accompanied by a discus ion of parameters estimated for the 
index of free-riding and model explaining internal free-riding. Evidence of serious free-
riding would suggest that EFO should change its institutional rules to better align 
individual costs and benefits.  
 
8.1 An empirical model of free-rider behaviour at EFO 
The study used principal components analysis (PCA) to construct an index from three 
related measures of free-riding. PCA is a data reduction technique that is often used to 
investigate relationships between variables (Doll & Chin, 1970; Essa & Nieuwoudt, 2003) 
and to construct uncorrelated indexes of correlated variables (Nieuwoudt, 1972; 1977).  
 
PCA achieves parsimony and reduces dimensionality by extracting the smallest number of 
principal components (PCi) that account for most of the variation in the original 















where xj were the p variables under study. The coefficients αij were computed such that the 
first principal component or index (PC1) accounts for the largest share of variance in the 
original xj as is possible, and the second index (PC2) was chosen to be uncorrelated with 
the first and to account for the largest possible share of the remaining variance, and so on 
(Nieuwoudt 1977). PCi with eigen values smaller than unity could be ignored as they 
account for less variation than do any of the original xj. In this study, the first principal 
component had an eigen value of 1.63 and accounted for 54% of the variation in the 
original xj (Section 8.3). This index (labelled FRINDEX) was used to compute a free-
riding score for each member of EFO. Descriptive stati tics computed for FRINDEX 
(Section 8.3) shed light on the prevalence and depth of free-riding within the organisation. 
 
Free-riding could have been measured directly as the proportion of each member’s produce 
rejected by the pack house, but produce delivered to the pack house could not be traced 
back to individual growers. Instead, three alternative variables were used to construct the 
composite measure FRINDEX. Two of these variables (attendance at meetings and pack 
house sales expressed as a proportion of total organic s les) were directly observable 
measures of free-riding, while declared willingness to contribute to investments was a 
subjective measure of free-riding within the organis tion. 
 
At the time of the survey a total of 11 monthly meetings had been called by EFO since the 
beginning of 2004. All partially certified members had joined EFO prior to the beginning 
of 2004 and were obliged to attend the same number of meeting as fully certified members. 






meetings. This study viewed non-attendance of monthly meetings as shirking and therefore 
as an indicator of free-riding by the member. The sare of pack house sales in total organic 
sales was treated as an inverse measure of free-riding by members who divert their better 
quality produce to other markets and benefit from non-traceability of low quality produce 
rejected by the pack house. 
 
With regard to the subjective measure of free-riding, members were asked if they would be 
willing to contribute capital to the organisation in order to finance shared improvements 
such as storage facilities. A ‘no’ answer was viewed as an indictor of free-riding by 
members faced with non-proportional benefits and a ‘horizon’ problem. The horizon 
problem has been analysed in the context of traditional marketing cooperatives (Cook & 
Iliopoulos 1999, 2002; Sykuta & Cook 2001). This problem is caused by residual claims 
that do not extend as far as the economic life of the underlying asset (Porter & Scully 
1987). Under these conditions, members tend to under-i v st in long-term and intangible 
assets because they cannot realise capital gains by retiring shares at their market value. 
New members become free riders as they benefit frompast investments without paying 
fully for them in the form of higher share prices. EFO’s constitution does not assign 
tradable (benefits and voting) rights to members and therefore exposes members to a free-
rider problem that discourages investment.  
 
8.2 Rationalising the empirical model of free-riding 
The study hypothesises that FRINDEX scores computed for each member could be 
explained by the net benefit score described in Section 7.2.3, the member’s level of trust in 
the buyer, asymmetric information, group size effects and personal characteristics. An 






Members’ perceptions of trust between EFO and the pack house were measured on a 
Likert-type scale of 1 (no trust) to 4 (strong trus). Following Dirks (1999), it was 
anticipated that members with higher perceptions of trust would be less inclined to free-
ride. The presence of asymmetric information, which is expected to aggravate free-riding, 
was indicated by a dummy variable scoring one if the respondent is aware of the flawed 
grading procedures, and zero otherwise.  
 
Information about changes in group size cannot be observed directly in a cross-sectional 
survey of one group. Instead, information about group size effects was captured indirectly 
by eliciting members’ perceptions of how an increase in group size would impact on 
EFO’s performance. A dummy variable was constructed, scoring one if the respondent 
thought the group’s performance would get weaker with increasing group size, and zero 
otherwise. Members’ age, education, gender, certifica on status (a proxy for experience), 
and family size were included as explanatory variables to capture the impact of personal 
and household characteristics on free-riding scores. No a priori predictions were made 
about the direction of impact that these variables might have on free-riding behaviour 
given ambiguous theory and mixed results from previous studies. Nevertheless, they could 
influence perceptions of trust, costs, benefits and bility to participate, and hence levels of 
free-riding. The following OLS regression model was estimated for the free-riding model. 
 
FRINDEXi = α0+α1X1i+α2X2i+α3X3i+α4X4i+α5X5i+α6X6i+α7X7i+α8X8i+ α9X9i +µi    (12) 
where FRINDEXi = principal component score computed for the ith member in 
standardised units, 






X2i = gender, a dummy variable scoring 1 if the ith member was female, and 0 
otherwise, 
X3i = education of the ith member in years of formal schooling, 
X4i = the ith member’s family size,  
X5i = certification status, a dummy variable scoring 1 if the ith member was fully 
certified, and 0 if partially certified, 
X6i = group size effects, a dummy variable scoring 1 if the ith respondent thought 
the group would get weaker with increasing group size, and 0 otherwise, 
X7i = asymmetric information, a dummy variable scoring 1 if the ith respondent was 
aware of flawed grading procedures, and 0 otherwise, 
X8i = net benefit score, 
X9i = trust score, a categorical variable ranked from 1 to 4 with increasing levels of 
trust. 
 
8.3 Prevalence and depth of free-riding  
Table 8.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used to compute FRINDEX, a 
free-riding index for EFO members. On average, members had attended only slightly more 
than half of the monthly meetings held since the beginning of 2004, and less than 38% of 
sales were channelled through the pack house. These directly observable variables suggest 
that group performance is constrained by free-riding. The subjective preferences expressed 






the members stated that they would be willing to contribute towards the cost of shared 
improvements (INVEST). 
 
Table 8.1: Variables used to compute free-riding index (FRINDEX), EFO, KwaZulu-
Natal (N=151), 2004/5 
Variables Unit  Mean 
Standard 
error 
Number of monthly meetings attended (MEETINGS) # 6.16 3.27 
Willing to contribute towards group investments (INVEST) % 66.89 47.22 
Pack house sales as a proportion of organic sales (SALES) % 37.36 41.35 
 
Principal components were extracted from the correlation matrix computed for the 
variables in Table 8.1. This implies that the component coefficients (αij) are standardised 
and therefore indicate the relative contribution of each variable to the principal component. 
Only the first principal component had an eigen value large enough (1.634) for it to be 
considered as an index of free-riding. This component accounted for 54% of the total 
variation the data – similar to the 57% reported by Naidu (2005) for his index of 
cooperation amongst users of common pool forests in India. The first principal component 





*)  (13) 
where the asterisks denote standardised variables. 
 
These variables contribute almost equally to the ind x as the coefficients are all of similar 
magnitude. Following the arguments presented in Chapter 5, FRINDEX can be interpreted 






guilty of free-riding to 1.91 for the member free-riding most. Figure 6.1 illustrates the 
distribution of scores on FRINDEX after being classified into four categories with equal 
intervals.  
 
Figure 8.1: Distribution of free-riding scores at EFO, KwaZulu-Natal (N=151), 2004/5 
 
The modal free-riding category is 2 (‘moderately low’) with more than 43% of the cases 
above it, suggesting that a substantial share of EFO’s members are free-riders. However, as 
explained in Section 5.2, it is important to establish which members are free-riding as free-
riding by ‘small’ members is assumed to be less damaging for group performance than is 






























marketing than do smaller farmers, and may therefore t lerate some free-riding by small 
farmers. A cross-tabulation of the categorised index scores with categorised farm sizes 
revealed that the largest farmers (>2 hectares) are also those with the largest index values 
as shown in Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2: Cross tabulation between free-rider and farm size categories at EFO, 
KwaZulu-Natal (N=151), 2004/5 
 Free-riding score categories Total 






< 1 21 42 22 19 104 
1.001 through 2 3 4 3 4 14 
2.001 through 3 0 0 3 1 4 
>3 0 0 3 0 3 
Total 24 46 31 24 125 
 
The chi-square statistic was statistically significant (χ2=11.9, p=0.008) indicating a positive 
relationship between farm size and free-riding. The implication is that free-riding could 
well constrain EFO’s performance. While it is not possible to make definitive statements 
about the incidence of free-riding at EFO, it is clear that free-riding occurred amongst 
larger farmers whose participation is assumed essential for group performance, and that 
variation in FRINDEX can be exploited to identify significant determinants of free-riding. 
 
8.4 Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
Table 8.3 presents descriptive statistics computed for the explanatory variables in the 
regression models. Variables such as age, gender, eucation, and net benefit score have 
already been presented in Section 7.2.4 as averages of each membership category. These 






EFO members only. The average age of EFO membership was 50 years, and the majority 
were women (75%). The mean level of education among EFO members was low at 4.61 
years of formal schooling. 
 
Table 8.3: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables of free-riding, EFO, 
KwaZulu-Natal (N=151), 2004/5  
 Variables Unit Mean* 
Age  Years 50.05 (13.94) 
Gender (female =1) % 74.83 
Education (years of formal schooling) Years   4.61 (4.41) 
Family size  #   8.36 (4.37) 
Certification status (fully certified =1) % 31.79 
Group size effects (group gets weaker =1) %   5.96 
Asymmetric information (present =1)  % 45.70 
Net benefit score #   5.96 (6.57) 
Trust score #   2.58 (0.25) 
* mean values with standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
About 6 per cent of the members perceived a negative correlation between increasing 
group size and group performance. The net benefit score, which ranged from negative 
eight to positive 22, averaged 5.96. Less than half of EFO members were aware of the 
flawed grading procedures. The trust score had a mean value of 2.58 and a standard error 
of just 0.25 indicating that few members reported strong feelings of trust or distrust in the 
buyer. 
 
8.5 Determinants of free-riding 
Table 8.4 presents the results of the OLS regression m del to test for the determinants of 
free-riding at EFO. The model is statistically significant and explains 41% of the variation 






Table 8.4: Marginal effects of explanatory variables on free-riding, EFO, KwaZulu-
Natal, 2004/5 
 Dependent variable = FRINDEX 
Explanatory variables β Standard error t-value 
Constant 2.742 0.589  4.655 
Age  (years)  -0.004 0.006 -0.731 
Gender (female=1)  -0.189* 0.116 -1.629 
Education (years of formal schooling)  -0.034* 0.019 -1.776 
Family size (#)  -0.018 0.020 -0.928 
Certification status (fully certified =1)  -0.954***  0.185 -5.157 
Group size effects (group gets weaker =1) 0.277 0.387   0.715 
Net benefit score  -0.007 0.013 -0.553 
Trust score  -0.356**  0.170 -2.088 
Asymmetric information (present=1) 0.227* 0.140   1.621 
Adjusted R-squared  0.410  
N  151  
Notes *Significant at 10% level of probability, ** Significant at 5% level of probability. 
*** Significant at 1% level of probability. 
 
The extent to which households differ in their contribution to the collective good has 
fascinated a number of economists and social scientists with much emphasis being placed 
on the role of gender.  There was some evidence that women are less inclined to free-ride 
than men as the gender coefficient was negative and statistically significant. This supports 
Bryson’s (2006) finding in New Zealand that women were less likely to free-ride than 
men. Andreoni et al. (2003) also found strong evidence that women and men have different 
preferences towards charitable contributions. 
 
Free-riding levels are also negatively associated with increasing levels of education. The 
coefficient estimated for education is statistically significant implying that relatively more 
educated organic farming group members were less likely to free-ride. The majority of 
rural household heads have low education levels. This makes education attainment a 






up to more educated group members for guidance and leadership. This makes it difficult 
for the very few educated members to shirk even if they wanted to do so. This is consistent 
with Chong’s (2001) finding that better educated inividuals are more cooperative. 
 
Certification status is a highly significant determinant of free-riding behaviour. EFO's new 
(partially certified) members were more likely to free-ride than are founding (fully 
certified) members. This finding is entirely consistent with the horizon problem described 
by Cook and Iliopoulos (1999, 2002) where, in the absence of tradable benefits and voting 
rights, new entrants free-ride on investments made by founding members. This could be 
referred to as forced free-riding because new members are forced to acquire new 
membership without paying for additional value created by founding members.  It is also 
consistent with Chong’s (2001) finding that length of association is negatively associated 
with free-riding among water users in Nicaragua and Guatemala. An alternative 
explanation may be that levels of trust increase with the length of association. Free-riding 
by partially certified could be due to lack of commit ent induced by an inferior 
certification status while full certification provides a psychological perception of 
completeness. 
 
Other studies of trust and cooperation raised concerns that the trust variable might be 
endogenously determined, giving rise to an endogeneity problem (La Porta et al., 1997; 
James, 2003; James & Sykuta, 2006; Mushayanyama & Darroch, 2006). A Hausman 
specification test for endogeneity (Gujarati, 2003: 756) was conducted and failed to reject 
the hypothesis of exogeneity at the 5 per cent level of probability. All variables, including 
trust, were therefore regarded as exogenous variables. The regression coefficient estimated 






contention that increasing trust in external agents (the buyer) reduces free-riding within the 
group. Free-riding is less likely to occur in situation where group members trust each other. 
Trust motivates group member to conform to generally accepted norms of group behaviour 
such as making a fair contribution, relying on others and trusting each other (Sheppard, 
1995). 
 
There was also some support for the argument that the presence of asymmetric information 
encourages free-riding. The regression coefficient estimated for asymmetric information 
was positive and statistically significant suggesting that members aware of the flawed 
grading procedures act opportunistically and free-rid . Research has shown that the 
temptation to free-ride is not reduced by identifiabil ty of contributions per se, but the 
increased chances of being caught that identifiability makes possible (Harkins, 1987). 
Hence, awareness of loopholes in the grading procedures would not invite free-riding if the 
risk of being caught is perceived to be high. 
 
Increasing group size is assumed to stimulate free-riding behaviour, but is of no 
consequence if effective monitoring mechanisms are in place. It was anticipated that 
concerns about the large increase in EFO’s membership would represent a significant 
determinant of free-riding in the absence of proportionality between individual costs and 
benefits. While perceptions that the group would weaken with increasing size do appear to 
contribute positively to free-riding, the effect was not statistically significant, possibly 
reflecting the subjective nature of the variable usd to measure changes in group size. The 







8.6 Chapter summary 
Organic groups cannot afford to ignore the consequences of free-riding on the performance 
of their members. Free-riding is a major concern in smallholder organic groups particularly 
if farmers with large land sizes are the culprits. Ideally, these are farmers who are better 
positioned to absorb free-riding by small farmers as long as their net benefits are positive. 
Free-riding makes member investments unattractive as returns are appropriated by those 
who have not contributed to their creation. 
 
Principal components analysis was used to combine three variables measuring different 
aspects of free-riding into a single index. Members’ scores on this index highlighted the 
presence of free-riding, and cross-tabulation of the index with farm size benchmarked the 
seriousness of the problem. Larger farmers, essential to EFO's collective marketing effort, 
exhibited relatively high levels of free-riding behaviour. Results of the OLS model 
suggested that members who are male, poorly educated, partially certified, aware of 
asymmetrical information related to grading procedur s, and who do not trust the buyer 







CHAPTER 9  
 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL MODEL OF CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS AT EFO 
NIE theory is applied to data gathered from members of EFO to assess their perceptions of 
existing contractual terms, and to quantify the impact of these perceptions on contract 
performance. Marketing contracts adopted by such groups tend to regulate transactions 
between the group and outside buyers such as pack houses and retailers. EFO is no 
exception, having negotiated a contract with just one buyer, a pack house in the city of 
Durban. This chapter presents the empirical models used to analyse contractual 
arrangements at EFO. It then focuses on variables us d to explain contract performance 
and preferred contractual terms. This is followed by descriptive statistics and a discussion 
on parameters estimated for the models explaining contract performance and preferred 
contract clauses.  
 
9.1 Analysing contractual arrangements at EFO 
9.1.1 Rationalising the empirical model of contract performance  
EFO management entered into a verbal marketing contract with the pack house. As 
explained earlier, the organisation pooled produce grown individually by its members and 
sold it to the pack house, where the produce was grded and repackaged for onward sale to 
the Woolworths retail chain. Some contractual terms are renegotiated seasonally, usually 
with the help of a facilitator from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The level of vertical 
coordination or contractual control by either party was limited. For example, the pack 






organic production is a complex process and incentiv s for opportunistic behaviour may 
exist within the supply chain (Hayenga et al., 2000).  
 
According to Sykuta and Parcel (2002) the basic source of value for most speciality crops 
is linked to the delivery of a particular type or identity of what could be generally be 
regarded as a commodity crop. EFO members were not compensated for supplying fresh 
vegetables to the pack house, but were paid for supplying organically produced vegetables. 
The basic source of value in the contract was, therefore, a farmer’s effort in preserving the 
organic identity of the produce. EFO’s management employed internal inspectors to help 
them monitor individual members’ compliance with organic farming standards both during 
the conversion period and after attaining full certification status. This was the only way of 
preserving organic identity under group certification when crops were produced 
independently by individual members. Non-compliance by any member could jeopardise 
the efforts of the entire group. 
 
A snapshot at some important contract clauses presented in Table 9.1 indicates that the 
contract between EFO and the pack house was verbal and denominated in weight. The 
pack house unilaterally set the base price of each year, had the power to call for deliveries 
to begin and had total control over grading procedur s. As a result, members complained 
frequently about pricing, payment, grading and treatm nt of rejected produce in particular, 
and contract implementation in general.  
 
Data relating to perceptions of existing contract clauses included each member’s 
understanding of contract format, denomination (weight or area), delivery calls, grading 






contractual terms. Information about actual terms specified in the verbal contract was 
elicited from key informants within EFO’s management committee. These variables 
complement observations on grower and farm characteristics.  
 
Table 9.1 presents sample means computed for the dep n nt and explanatory variables 
considered in a model proposed to quantify the impact of perceived contract clauses on 
contract performance. Contract performance is usually assessed based on agreed targets or 
benchmarks. In this study, contract performance was measured by the quantity of organic 
produce delivered to the pack house by each farmer. This measure of performance was 
considered reasonable because EFO does assign delivery targets to individuals members in 
absolute terms. The quantity supplied by the each frmer therefore reflects an attempt at 
fulfilling the membership obligations of the group. Failure to meet such quotas could be 
indicative of extra-contractual marketing by the producers or poor crop yields. Either way, 
it demonstrates inability to meet contractual obligations, hence poor contract performance. 
It is therefore reasonable to use the quantity of pr duce delivered to the pack house as a 
relative measure of contract performance. The model postulated that contract performance 
was influenced by perceived contractual terms and control variables such as age, gender, 
organic farming experience, and farm size. 
 
In Table 9.1, contract format refers to the choice between a verbal (informal) and a written 
(formal) contract. In reality, EFO’s agreement with the pack house is a verbal contract, yet 
15% of the organisation’s members claimed that it was a written contract. It was 
anticipated that members who perceived that the agrement was a verbal contract would 
tend to under-perform, ceteris paribus, because informal contracts are difficult to enforce 






Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics for variables included in the contract performance 
model (N=151), EFO, KwaZulu-Natal, 2004/5 
Dependent variable    
Variable Unit Description Mean  
Quantity of 
produce  
Tons Produce delivered by member to EFO in 
2004 
0.224  
Explanatory variables  Mean Actual# 
Age Years Farmer (member’s) age 50.05  




Years as an organic farmer (EFO 
member) 
2.51  




Perception that current contract is verbal 






Perception that current contract is 






Perception that buyer calls for deliveries 





Perception that contract does not specify 







Perception that price is jointly 
determined by buyer and EFO =1, 
otherwise =0 
0.56 0 
# ‘Actual’ indicates contractual terms actually specifi d by EFO’s verbal marketing 
agreement. 
 
Most studies of contract choice and design use the ‘contract’ as the unit of analysis. In this 
case, as with most efforts to integrate smallholders into favourable markets, there was a 
single contract between the (horizontally coordinated) farmer’s group and the buyer. 
Owing to the absence of a standard written contract, the verbal contract provided a good 
simulation of multiple contracts as farmers are likly to differ in their understanding of the 
verbal clauses. For these reasons, members were taken as the unit of analysis. Each 
member declared his or her knowledge of existing contract specifications as well as their 






contract clauses – an approach similar to that employed by Fraser (2005), Goodhue et al. 
(2000) and Sykuta and Parcel (2002).  
 
Contracts like EFO’s may be denominated in terms of weight or area. In the former case, 
farmers are obliged to supply a specific volume of pr duce to the buyer over a given period 
of time. In the latter case, farmers must plant a specific area with the buyer obligated to 
purchase all of the output. Weight based contracts ssign yield risk to the farmer while area 
based contracts shift this risk to the buyer. Members who (correctly) perceived that EFO 
was contracted to produce a particular volume of each organic crop were therefore 
expected to be more concerned about performance than those who thought that the contract 
was area based. 
 
Delivery calls defining rights to call for supplies influence the distribution of risk between 
contractual parties. The party that decides when deliveries should start and end is better 
placed to manage deliveries to his or her advantage. Members of EFO were more likely to 
under-perform if they perceived that the pack house had the right to call for deliveries as 
the timing and delivery window may not coincide with physiological crop maturities 
experienced by growers.  
 
Grading procedures should not only specify criteria for classifying produce into different 
grades, but should also define when, how and by whom grading is to be done, and the 
procedures for dealing with rejected produce. Unfortunately, EFO’s verbal contract does 
not address all of these issues adequately. Althoug members grade their own produce, 
EFO pools deliveries from its growers and the buyer re-grades the pooled produce when it 






rejection rates because rejected produce cannot be trac d back to individual growers. 
Respondents frequently complained that their produce was being unfairly downgraded by 
the buyer. It was therefore anticipated that members who perceived that grading 
procedures were not properly specified by the verbal contract would tend to deliver less 
produce to the organic market. 
 
Price determination in spot markets is a function of demand and supply. Under contractual 
arrangements, prices are usually determined jointly by the buyer and seller. However, EFO 
appears to have little bargaining power – possibly because it lacked alternative organic 
markets, whereas the pack house can purchase organic products from competing suppliers. 
According to members of EFO’s management committee, th  pack house established a 
base price at the beginning of each season.  It was anticipated that members who perceived 
that base prices were jointly determined would deliver more produce to the pack house. 
 
9.1.2 Rationalising the empirical model of preferred contract clauses 
Following Sykuta and Parcel’s (2002) study, logit models were proposed to identify the 
determinants of preferred contract characteristics considered to be of central importance to 
the performance of EFO’s collective contract with the pack house. Table 9.2 presents 
descriptive statistics for these key preferences. Literature has shown that contract choice is 
a function of farm and grower characteristics (Frase , 2005; Goodhue et al., 2000) 
including age (which is also a proxy for past farming experience not necessarily tied to 
organic farming), education (which influences ability to prepare and read a written 







Table 9.2: Descriptive statistics for variables used to explain preferred contract 
format and contract denomination (N=151), EFO, KwaZulu-Natal, 2004/5 
Dependent variables  
Variable Unit Description Mean 
Preferred contract 
format 
Binary Written contract preferred =1, verbal =0 0.14 
Preferred contract 
denomination 
Binary Area denominated contract preferred =1, 









Binary Joint price setting preferred =1, otherwise=0 0.99 
Preferred delivery 
calls 
    Binary Farmer’s call for deliveries preferred =1, 
otherwise =0 
0.95 
Explanatory variables  
Variable Unit Description Mean 
Age Years Farmer’s age 50.05 
Formal education Years Years of formal schooling 4.60 
Family labour Adult 
equivalents 
Available family labour 4.12 
Farm income Rands# Cash income from organic sales in 2004/5 545.34 
Organic farming 
experience 
Years Years as an organic farmer (EFO member) 2.51 
# One US Dollar = 6.45 Rand at the time of the survey (South African Reserve Bank, 
2005). 
 
It is not possible to rationalise a priori how all of these variables were likely to affect 
preferences for particular contractual terms, but it was anticipated that preferences for 
written contracts, area based denomination, well-defined grading procedures, jointly 
negotiated prices and delivery calls made by farmers would strengthen with increases in 
member education and the importance of farm income. 
 
9.1.3 Modelling contract performance 
The model of contract performance proposed by Equation (14) was estimated using 






produce delivered by members to EFO for sale to the pack house depends on farm, farmer, 
and contract characteristics:  
)14(εβα ++= ijZX ijYi  
where;  Yi  = quantity of organic produce delivered by the i
th EFO member to the pack 
house, 
α = coefficients of farm and farmer characteristics, 
ijX = vector of farm and farmer characteristics, 
β = coefficients of binary contract variables, 
ijZ = vector of dichotomous variables representing perceived contractual terms, and  
ε = random error. 
Contract performance (Yi ) was measured by the quantity of organic produce delivered by 
each EFO member to the pack house during the 2004/5 marketing season. Farm and farmer 
characteristics ( ijX ) were represented by variables such as age, gender, organic farming 
experience and farm size, while the (ijZ ) indicated perceptions that the contract entitled he 
pack house to call for deliveries, specify joint price determination and grading procedures, 







9.1.4 Modelling preferred contract clauses 
Equation (15) postulates that each of the key contract clauses preferred by EFO members is 
influenced by personal and farm characteristics. Equation (15) is expressed as a binary 
logit model as the preferred contract clauses were all xpressed as dichotomous variables. 
For a binary response model, )1,0(∈Υ  let x  be a vector of z  regressors, and iπ  be the 
probability ( )xY 1Pr = . The logistic model is a linear model for the log dds, or logit that 















where; α = intercept, 
β = vector of regression coefficients, and 
Xi = vector of farm and farmer characteristics. 
Logit models were postulated for preferred contract format, preferred contract 
denomination, preferred grading procedures, preferrd method of price determination and 
preferred delivery calls. These models included personal attributes and farm characteristics 
as possible determinants of preferred contract clauses. Possible determinants of these five 
preferences include formal education and organic farming experience as personal 
characteristics, and farm income and the household’s stock of farm labour as farm 
characteristics (Table 9.2). Formal education was likely to capture the effects of age and 








9.2 General assessment of contract impact at EFO 
Interviews conducted with key informants helped to identify information needed to assess 
individual costs and benefits of honouring EFO’s contract with the pack house. It was clear 
that the verbal contract enabled coordination, making the supply chain more efficient when 
compared to no contracting. Transaction costs normally incurred in the marketing of fresh 
produce were considerably reduced for both individual farmers and the buyer. In addition, 
transport and fencing costs were subsidised by the gov rnment.  
 
However, there was limited transfer of market information, management skills or organic 
production technology to farmers despite the buyer occasionally meeting with members to 
educate them about grading and quality issues. The contract provided a hedge against 
downward movements in producer prices, but disadvantaged producers when prices 
increased. When a contract specifies a fixed price, both parties expect the contract price to 
differ from the spot price. Problems develop when the price gap becomes too wide for too 
long, thereby encouraging the disadvantaged party to default (Koehler, 1999). When the 
pack house was at a disadvantage it stopped making calls for deliveries in order to cut its 
losses. The contract assigned this right to the pack house without specifying a delivery 
window or the terms of the buyer’s call (e.g. the notice period). Impromptu calls with short 
notice periods were common, encouraging members to sell organic produce in 
conventional fresh produce markets rather than endur  the risk of damage to mature crops 
whilst waiting for the buyer’s next call. 
 
At the time of the study, the contract provided local farmers with their only avenue to an 
organic market. Market access was reasonably assured and the buyer carried some price 






agriculture systems (Delgado, 1999). The buyer facilit ted a deal with the Provincial 
Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs (DAEA) whereby members were 
granted fencing materials to protect their crops against damage caused by stray livestock. 
Otherwise, there was no improvement in their access to agricultural credit or organic inputs 
- including disease free planting materials. This meant farmers still used the same 
production system as was the case before conversion and did not benefit in any significant 
way from the organic contract in that regard. 
 
The narrow range of benefits accruing to farmers indicates that EFO’s marketing contract 
has not set a strong precedent for organic farming projects aimed at alleviating poverty in 
rural South Africa. Nor has the uncertainty that surro nds the contract itself. 
 
9.2.1 Impact of contractual terms on contract performance  
Members’ perceptions of existing contract clauses highlight their confusion about actual 
contractual terms, and are used to explain differences in contract performance between 
individual members. Table 9.3 presents the OLS estimates of the parameters (α andβ ) 
defined in Equation (14).  
 
The binary variables - contract format, contract denomination, grading procedures, price 
determination and delivery calls - are collinear, which makes it impossible to estimate their 
separate effects on contract performance. Two linear indexes of these variables are 
extracted using Principal Components Analysis (PCA). A Principal Components Analysis 
based only on binary dummy variables is sometimes referred to as a Principal Co-ordinate 






greater than one, represented by Equations 16 and 17. Together, these two PCs explain 
64.7% of total variation in the binary variables, with 1PC  accounting for 37.4% of the total 
variation. 
 
)16(0.547GP0.799DC0.863PDPC ***1 −−=  
)17(0.731CF0.842CDPC **2 −=  
where the asterisks denote standardised variables.  
 
The standardised component loadings indicate the relativ  contribution of each variable to 
the principal component. PC1 attributes relatively high loadings (greater than │0.3│) to 
price determination, delivery calls and grading procedures. This index increased when 
members perceived that prices were jointly determined, delivery calls were made by the 
EFO, and grading procedures were well defined. PC2 attributes relatively high loadings to 
contract denomination and contract format. This index increased when the contract was 
perceived to be weight denominated and formalised in wr ting. Both of these indexes were 
therefore expected to bear positively on contract performance and were substituted for the 
binary contract dummies in Equation 14. The OLS estimators of Equation 14 are presented 
in Table 9.3. 
 
The regression coefficient estimated for age was sttistically significant and positive, 
suggesting that older members were more inclined to comply with the buyer’s calls than 
were younger members. Although the coefficient estimated for organic farming experience 






consideration. The positive sign suggests that contract performance improved as members 
gained experience as organic farmers, or possibly those members of longer standing had 
developed confidence in the contract and were more willing to sell produce to the pack 
house.  
 
Table 9.3: Impact of perceived contract provisions on quantity of organic produce 
delivered by members of EFO, KwaZulu-Natal, 2004/5. 
Predictors β Standard 
error 
t-value 
(Constant)  0.027 0.155 0.175 
Age (years)  0.005**  0.002 1.912 
Farm size (ha)  0.009 0.029 0.307 
Gender (female =1, male =0)  0.026 0.069 0.373 
Organic farming experience (years)  0.002 0.002 1.303 
PC1 – index of price determination, delivery calls & 
grading procedures a 
 0.138***  0.029 4.721 
PC2 – index of contract format & contract denomination 
b  -0.021 0.031 -0.664 
Adjusted R2  0.22  
N  151  
Notes  a First principal component. 
 b Second principal component. 
*significant at 10% level of probability, ** significant at 5% level of probability. 
 ***significant at 1% level of probability 
The regression coefficient estimated for PC1 was statistically significant. Its positive sign 
was consistent with the arguments presented in Chapter 4. Contract performance improves 
when members perceived that: (a) prices were determin d jointly by EFO and the pack 
house, (b) deliveries were called by EFO and not by the pack house and (c) grading 
procedures were well defined. This result supports p evious findings that flawed grading 
procedures encouraged EFO’s members to withhold their best quality produce from the 
organic market (Gadzikwa, et al., 2006b) and that the benefits of collective marketing were 






The regression coefficient estimated for PC2 was not statistically significant suggesting that 
perceptions of a written, weight denominated contract did not have a positive influence on 
contract performance. The overriding importance of PC1 was illustrated by its standardised 
regression coefficient (beta) of 0.41. Age was the next most important variable with a beta 
of 0.19, followed by organic farming experience with a beta of 0.12. PC2 had an absolute 
beta of just 0.06.  
 
9.2.2 Determinants of preferred contract provisions 
Preliminary analysis of the contract clauses in Table 7.1 indicate that only the preferred 
contract format and preferred contract denomination variables contained enough variation 
to permit further analysis. The other preferred contract characteristics - proper grading 
procedures, joint price determination and farmer’s delivery calls - lacked variability (see 
Table 7.1) leading to their exclusion in subsequent analyses. 
 
Table 9.2 presents descriptive statistics for prefer d contract clauses and for variables 
thought to influence their choice. Only 14% of the m mbers preferred a written contract, 
but 71% preferred an area denominated contract (71%). Almost all members preferred 
well-defined grading procedures (99%), joint price setting (99%), and farmer delivery calls 
(95%). Of the other explanatory variables in Table 9.2, only the descriptive statistic for 
farm income from organic sales was not discussed in preceding sections. Family labour 
was now computed as an average for all EFO members. Family labour and farm income 







9.2.3 Preferred contract format and contract denomination 
As explained in Section 9.2.2, the vast majority (71%) of EFO’s members stated a 
preference for area rather than weight denomination. This was expected as area 
denomination shifts the burden of yield risk to thebuyer. Conversely, a small minority 
(14%) of EFO’s members stated a preference for a written rather than a verbal contract. 
Like the OLS results presented in Section 9.2.1, this finding is at odds with the view that 
verbal agreements discourage performance by introducing uncertainty and inviting free-
riding. Low levels of literacy might explain this anomaly. The results of the logit analyses 
are presented in Table 9.4.  
 
Table 9.4: Logit models of preferences for written and area denominated contracts, 
EFO, KwaZulu-Natal, 2004/5 
 Preferred contract characteristic 














Constant  1.077 0.912 1.396 0.341  0.792 0.490 2.614 2.207 
Formal education  0.099* 0.060 2.685 1.104  0.154***  0.052 8.785 1.166 
Family labour -0.106 0.138 0.582 0.900 -0.136 0.092 2.163 0.873 
Farm income  0.001**  0.000 3.826 1.001  0.000 0.000 0.205 1.000 
Organic farming 
experience 
-0.551**  0.262 4.409 0.577 -0.008 0.023 0.114 0.992 
-2 Log likelihood 91.96**  146.62***  
N 151 151 
* Significant at 10% level of probability, ** significant at 5% level of probability, *** 
significant at 1% level of probability. 
 
With regard to contract format, the coefficient estimated for education was positive and 






levels of formal education, suggesting that farmers with relatively more schooling were 
better able to read and understand written contracts. 
 
In this study, poor education was also a proxy for age and gender because the vast majority 
of EFO’s members were elderly women with low levels of education. This was consistent 
with Saenz-Segura’s (2006) finding in Costa Rica tht older, more experienced farmers 
with less education preferred verbal contracts. Goodhue et al. (2000) and Fraser (2005) 
found a positive relationship between educational qualifications and the preference for 
written contracts in the United States of America and Australian wine industries 
respectively. 
 
The coefficient estimated for farm income was statiically significant and bears positively 
on preferences for a written contract. A plausible explanation is that members who derive 
more income from farming have more to lose if the pack house does not honour its contract 
with EFO and therefore favour the relative security of a formal contract over an informal 
one. Increasing levels of organic farming experience tend to reduce preferences for a 
written contract. Again, this was consistent with Saenz-Segura’s (2006) finding and lends 
support to the view that members of longer standing have developed confidence in their 
verbal contract.  
 
Two variables appeared to influence preferences for area based contract denomination; 
formal education and family labour. The significant d positive coefficient estimated for 
formal education suggests that better educated members may be more aware of the 
relationship between yield risk and contract denomiation. These members favoured a 






there is a bumper crop and to source crops elsewher if there is a shortfall. The coefficient 
estimated for family farm labour was not statistically significant but has a Wald χ2 statistic 
greater than two. Its negative sign suggested that members with less household labour to 
draw on also prefer a contract based on area – possibly because labour shortages exposed 
them to additional source of yield risk.  
 
9.3 Chapter summary 
Contracts enable smallholders to access organic markets and could have considerable 
impact on quality and loyalty issues along the supply chain. Because production systems 
are better managed, the quality of produce vastly improves and loyalty is reinforced by a 
contract in situations where farmers are afforded the opportunity to deliver frequently, 
cutting down post-harvest losses and amounts of reject d produce. As expected, EFO 
farmers are confused about the organisation’s verbal contract with its buyer (a local pack 
house). There is no consensus on the contractual clauses. An evaluation of how differences 
over perceived contract clauses impacts on contract performance measured in absolute 
terms by the amount of organic produce supplied to the pack house by each farmer 
produced mixed results. Improved contract performance is associated with the perception 
that; (a) prices are determined jointly by EFO and the pack house, (b) deliveries are called 
by EFO and not by the pack house, and (c) grading procedures are well defined and 
prevent free-riding by growers who deliver products of inferior quality. 
 
Choice of preferred contract clauses reveals an underlying attempt to mitigate production 
and marketing risks associated with smallholder organic farming. Improved education and 
income levels and low organic farming experience ar positively aligned with written 






education (awareness) and lower levels of family farm labour. Labour shortages heighten 
the risk that farmers bear when the contract was weight denominated. In summary, contract 
performance is enhanced by contract clauses that mitigate production and market related 







CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main objective of this study was to contribute to the body of knowledge on functions 
and operations of organic certified smallholder groups by exploring institutional and 
contractual arrangements that would make such groups more effective in accessing high 
value niche markets.  
 
This study drew on the NIE’s collective action and transaction cost theories to identify 
possible determinants of participation in EFO, a certifi d organic farming group operating 
in the former Umbumbulu magisterial district of KwaZulu-Natal, as an institution to 
improve smallholder access to a niche market by reducing unit production, marketing and 
transaction costs in the supply chain. A multinomial logit model was estimated to isolate 
significant determinants of three different levels of participation in EFO (non-members, 
partially certified members and fully certified members). Explanatory variables included 
farm and farmer attributes, a variable measuring the perceived net benefits of collective 
action, and indicators of production and transaction c sts. 
 
The results indicated that continued participation in EFO was not influenced by the age or 
gender of the farmer, was positively influenced by growth in the net benefits of 
participation, and negatively by an increase in the siz  of the smallholder’s cropland or 
non-farm earnings. With respect to production and transaction costs, the results suggest 
that EFO has reduced fully certified members’ concer s that crops would be damaged by 






for other problems such as price uncertainty in conventional markets, lack of affordable 
operating inputs, lack of affordable transport, and lack of communications infrastructure. 
 
The major obstacle to unlocking member investments could be the existence of free-riding 
problems within the group. The study revealed an internal free-rider problem at EFO and 
identified its determinants. Principal components analysis was used to combine three 
variables measuring different aspects of free-riding into a single index. Members’ scores 
on this index highlighted the presence of free-riding, and cross-tabulation of the index with 
farm size benchmarked the seriousness of the problem. Larger farmers, essential to EFO's 
collective marketing effort, exhibited relatively hig  levels of free-riding behaviour. 
Results of the OLS model suggested that members who are male, poorly educated, 
partially certified, aware of asymmetrical information related to grading procedures, and 
who do not trust the buyer were more likely to free- ide.  
 
Considering the importance of an incentive compliant contract to mitigate free-rider 
problems, it was disappointing to find that EFO’s members were confused about the 
organisation’s verbal contract with its buyer (a local pack house). Descriptive statistics 
measuring farmers’ perceptions of the contract terms evealed a lack of consensus about 
contractual clauses. The study then evaluated how te confusion over contractual terms 
impacted on contract performance, where contract performance was measured as the 
quantity of organic produce delivered by EFO members for sale to the pack house. 
Principal component indexes of perceived contractual terms were regressed on contract 
performance using an OLS model that controlled for farm and farmer characteristics. The 
OLS results showed that contract performance improved when members perceived that; (a) 






and not by the pack house, and (c) grading procedures are well defined and prevent free-
riding by growers who deliver products of inferior quality. 
 
Logit models were then estimated to identify the determinants of some preferred contract 
clauses. The results indicated that members with higher levels of formal education 
(literacy) and farm income, and lower levels of exprience, favoured a written contract 
over a verbal contract. Similarly, members with higher levels of formal education 
(awareness) and lower levels of family farm labour favoured a contract denominated by 
area rather than by weight. Labour shortages heightn the risk that farmers bear when the 
contract was weight denominated.  
 
It can be concluded that EFO should target households that rely on farming for income and 
that are relatively land constrained. EFO is more lik ly to survive if it continues to secure 
fully subsidised information, transport, fencing and certification services for its members, 
and if it improves the benefits of participating by synchronising harvest and delivery dates, 
negotiating price discounts for organic inputs, andby maintaining an office with telephone, 
fax and postal services. However, long-term sustainability is unlikely if the organisation 
has to rely on subsidies to meet recurrent expenditure on private goods like transport and 
certification services. Subsidy dependence could be reduced by recruiting more members 
and marketing larger volumes. This will facilitate bulk discounts and reduce EFO’s 
average fixed costs, including those arising from investments in equipment and plant of its 
own. The need for investment raises questions about EFO’s ability to raise capital. A 
fundamental question is whether or not members, lenders, and potential partners (e.g. the 






In the longer-term, EFO should eliminate institutionalised free-riding by re-organising 
along the lines of an investor-owned firm that issues tradable ownership rights proportional 
to individual investment. This will facilitate partnerships needed to finance value-adding 
investments that improve the flow of net benefits to members. In the short-term, EFO must 
engage with the pack house to remove flaws in the grading process that conceal the origin 
of low quality produce. Transparent and mediated negotiations leading to an incentive 
compliant contract with the buyer may also help to build trust and so reduce free-riding 
within EFO. Information about the goals and benefits of membership should be actively 
disseminated. Penalties for non-compliance might also be considered.  
 
The study also recommends that the terms of EFO’s contract be revised so that: (a) 
delivery calls can be made by either the pack house r by EFO during pre-specified periods 
and with reasonable notice, and (b) grading procedures are fully transparent and ensure 
traceability so that losses caused by poor quality can be internalised to members who 
deliver inferior produce. In addition, it is important that prices should be negotiated at the 
beginning of each season and that the parties should have recourse to pre-agreed 
facilitators and an arbitrator to resolve disputes on price and quality. A written contract is 
recommended to support these more complex terms, with the proviso that the contract is 
explained to current and prospective members, and that growers are fully informed of their 
rights and obligations.  
 
While the above recommendations address specific issues at group level there are more 
issues that are critical demanding attention at organic industry level. South Africa has no 
national organic standards and regulations in place and as a result, government’s support to 






of their national mandates. This creates confusion in the organic industry and reduces the 
impact organic agriculture might have on the South African economy. Clearly, government 
needs to clarify policies relating to organic production and marketing. The study proposes 
the following specific policy recommendations to address collective action, free-riding and 
contractual problems in smallholder farming groups.  
 
There is need for a policy that promotes smallholders’ continued participation in collective 
marketing groups and discourages member exit. Such a policy should encourage 
participation by consolidating existing collective action benefits through formulation and 
implementation of measures that minimise or even eliminate transaction costs experienced 
by participating farmers. Improving communication infrastructure and transport networks 
in the rural areas would help alleviate problems of access to market and communication. In 
addition, productivity could improve if farmers have access to affordable production 
inputs. Ensuring that rural farmers have access to affordable financial products will address 
the problem of affordability and present farmers with more choice regarding input 
suppliers.  
 
While policies that reduce transaction costs will enhance farmer participation, appropriate 
institutional arrangements that curb free-riding behaviour by aligning costs and benefits of 
participating smallholders are equally important. There is need to encourage smallholder 
farmers to select appropriate legal entities with well-defined property rights. While co-
operatives are suitable under certain circumstances, th  promotion of better organisational 
forms such as ‘New Generation’ co-operatives should be a priority. The policy required to 
stimulate smallholder participation in collective action and curb free-riding must take into 






farmers from many uncertainties and risks associated with collective marketing. The 
primary policy objective will be to encourage written contracts that mitigate yield and 







The NIE framework offers a number of approaches, techniques and concepts for analysing 
institutions or ‘rules of the game’ that shape the incentives which guide decisions taken by 
individuals. The first general approach is that of ransaction and information costs in which 
institutions are viewed as transaction-cost minimising arrangements. The second approach 
is concerned with collective action and elimination f the free-rider problem in the 
provision of collective goods. 
 
These approaches are pertinent to the study of certi ied organic farming groups such as 
EFO. On the one hand, smallholders face high fixed production and transactions costs 
relative to income when accessing markets individually owing to their small surpluses. It 
follows that small farmers incur high unit transport, information, and monitoring costs 
(Hobbs, 1997). On the other hand, collective action o dilute these fixed production and 
transaction costs introduces other costs and is often hampered by problems such as free-
riding (Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1992a) when farmer groups organise along the lines of 
conventional cooperatives (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999). Despite powerful conceptual 
insights shed by collective action and transaction c st theories, application of both theories 
remains limited (Benham & Benham, 2000). This study draws on both theories to analyse 
the role played by EFO in addressing production and marketing constraints perceived by 
members and non-members. In addition, the study draws on free-riding theory to measure 
the prevalence of internal free-riding at EFO and to identify its determinants. 
 
From a NIE perspective, contracts are viewed as governance mechanisms designed to 






vertical coordination continuum, lying somewhere between the spot market and full 
vertical integration. Williamson (1991) identified three classes of contracts that have 
relevance in determining coordination performance. These are classical, neoclassical and 
relational contracts.  NIE provides a theoretical framework that helps to explain the 
existence of contract farming, as many problems associated with imperfect and missing 
markets are caused by asymmetric information and other factors that raise transaction costs 
(Minot, 1999; Grosh, 1994; Key & Rusten, 1999). NIE theory is applied to data gathered 
from members of EFO to assess their perceptions of existing contractual terms, and to 
quantify the impact of these perceptions on their dlivery of organic vegetables. Marketing 
contracts adopted by such groups tend to regulate tr nsactions between the group and 
outside buyers such as pack houses and retailers. EFO is no exception, having negotiated a 
contract with just one buyer, a pack house. The study also seeks to identify determinants of 
preferred contractual terms. It does not test for optimality of current contract design, nor 
does it explicitly test for propositions of contract theory. 
 
EFO was initiated in 2001 by the University of Natal, (which subsequently merged with 
University of Durban Westville to form University of KwaZulu-Natal) as a project to 
produce traditional vegetables. The group explored an achieved organic certification in 
2003. At the time of the study, EFO the oldest certifi d organic farming group in South 
Africa, pooled and sold produce grown individually b  its members to a pack house near 
the city of Durban. The pack house supplied a retail chain well known for its high quality 
products in South Africa. Principal crops cultivated include amadumbe, green beans, sweet 
potatoes, and potatoes. EFO’s constitution entrenches several principles that underpin 
traditional cooperatives; such as net margins distributed according to patronage, 






of fully organic certified farmers who founded the organisation, and partially certified 
members who joined later and who are transitioning to fully certified status. Unlike a 
cooperative, EFO has no equity ownership scheme and, therefore, does not offer shares in 
return for capital invested by its members. The arguments presented by Cook and 
Iliopoulos (2002) seem to suggest that EFO is likely to suffer from free-rider problems 
because the gains from cooperative action can be accessed by individuals who did not fully 
invest in creating them. 
 
This study was conducted within Embo community in the Umbumbulu Magisterial 
District, KwaZulu-Natal. Data were collected from a census survey of 151 EFO members 
and sample survey of 49 non-EFO members. Of the 151 EFO members, 48 were fully 
certified and 103 were partially certified organic farmers. Data were gathered in two 
phases.  In the first phase, a producer and a houseld questionnaire were administered in 
the last quarter of 2004 to all respondents. In the second phase, a follow-up producer and 
household questionnaires were administered during the first quarter of 2005. These 
questionnaires surveys were complemented by key intrviews held with some members of 
EFO management committee. 
 
The investigation of factors influencing continued participation in EFO’s marketing effort 
by individual members revealed that participation was encouraged by growth in net 
benefits of participating, and negatively correlated with increasing farm size or non-farm 
income. The evaluation of production and transaction c sts showed that EFO managed to 
reduce fully certified members’ concerns that crops would be damaged by livestock or 
constrained by inadequate technical information. However, members were still concerned 






of affordable transport and a lack of communication nfrastructure. This implies that 
collective action was not effective in reducing these transaction costs.  
 
This study revealed that an internal free-riding problem existed within EFO. Using three 
variables measuring different aspects of free-riding, a free-riding index was computed, 
which was then cross tabulated with farm size. Unfortunately high index scores, indicative 
of serious free-riding, were observed among larger farmers essential to EFO’s collective 
marketing effort. This poses serious questions about fut re sustainability of the group as a 
whole. Without being definitive about free-riding levels in EFO, the results suggest that the 
group is prone to the “sucker” effect caused by free-riding behaviour. As result, non free-
riders may reduce their efforts in response to internal free-riding. The estimated empirical 
free-riding model indicated that members who were male, poorly educated, partially 
certified, aware of asymmetrical information related to grading procedures, and who did 
not trust the buyer were more likely to free-ride. 
 
The findings on the existing verbal contract between EFO and pack house showed that 
EFO was benefiting from better coordination compared to no contracting. Some 
transaction costs were reduced for both individual farmers and the buyer such as transport, 
which was subsided by government. The major weaknesses of the contract included 
limited transfer of market information, management skills and organic technology to the 
farmers by the buyer. Despite being hedged against downward movement in produce 
prices, the farmers were disadvantaged when the pric s increased. In some instances, the 







Given the verbal nature of the contract and the limited range of benefits accruing to the 
farmers, the study examined the members’ understanding of verbal contract clauses and 
their impact on contract performance. Contract performance being measured by the 
quantity of produce delivered to the pack house, th results showed that older farmers were 
more cooperative and were more like to heed buyers’ calls than younger ones. An index of 
contract clauses suggested that joint price determination by EFO and pack house, well 
defined grading procedures and farmer made delivery calls had a positive impact on 
deliveries made to the pack house, hence contract performance.  
 
A further evaluation of determinants of preferred contract clauses evaluated the 
determinants of preferred contract format (verbal or written) and contract denomination 
(area or weight) clauses. Preference for any of these clauses could be indicative of clauses 
likely to dominate in future organic contracts. Poor education, a proxy for age and gender 
as the majority of EFO members were old women with low literacy levels, was associated 
with preference for verbal contracts. Farmers who had more organic farming experience 
also preferred verbal contracts, possibly due to increased confidence in verbal contracts 
over time. By contrast, farmers relying more on farm income preferred written contracts 
that are relatively more secure. The preference for area based contract was influenced by 
formal education and family labour. The more educated members were aware that an area 
based contract shifts the risk to the buyer who is f rced to purchase all output in case of a 
bumper harvest and source it elsewhere when there is shortfall. 
 
This study has contributed to the understanding of smallholder organic farming group 
institutions. Further research is still required to test the study’s findings over several groups 






and portfolio on sustainability of collective outcomes should be investigated, in addition to 
seeking a better understanding of their determinants. This study concludes that collective 
action should be strengthened through ensuring group access to subsidized services, 
synchronisation of harvesting and delivery dates, and through investment in business 
assets. 
 
Free-riding can be mitigated through issuance of tradable shares and engaging with the 
buyer to remove flaws in the grading procedures that conceal origins of poor quality 
produce. The group’s marketing effort should be supported by an incentive compliant 
contract that ensures transparent in grading and imple entation of delivery calls and 
jointly negotiated prices. These contract terms must be supported by a written contract to 
minimise misinformation about contract terms and improve contract enforcement. 
 
At policy level, the study recommends that the promulgation of a policy that consolidates 
the benefits accruing to farmers engaged in collectiv  action by minimising the levels of 
production and transaction costs faced by smallholders. Such a policy should be tailored to 
promote the development of appropriate organisationl arrangements that are better at 
aligning costs and benefits of participating in collective action in an attempt to curb 
institutional problems such as free-riding. Equally important is the need to promote use of 
written contracts that protect smallholders in contractual arrangements from yield and price 
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7.1 When you attend EFO meetings, how much information do you get on the following? 
(Note: information in brackets is for clarification for the enumerator. Not to be read out) 
 
 Tick 
 None Little Lots 
Farming organically    
- improving the soil     
- pest and disease control     
- irrigation and water harvesting    
- not using  chemical fertilizers or pest sprays     
other (specify)     
Marketing and sales    
- how much you should produce for the packhouse     
- the packhouse (its location, operations, function)     
- other places to sell organic crops     
- new organic crops (e.g. beans, herbs, etc)     
- other (specify)     
Certification    
- rules for certification     
- cost of certification     
- inspections for certification    
- results of inspections    
- other (specify)     
Organisation    
- decisions made by the Executive Committee     
- issues currently being considered by the Executive Committee     
- plans for EFOs future    
- membership (rules for joining, participation, number of 
members)   
   
- internal procedures for sale of produce (harvesting, collecting 
and delivering)   
   
- internal procedures for payment to farmers    
- other (specify)     
 
7.2    When you did not attend EFO’s monthly meeting, how often did you get information about 
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